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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on the American public’s war calculus
that hang together in two main ways.
First, these essays all attempt to quantitatively measure how certain things about
a mission abroad—including the positions of domestic and international elites on it,
its American and enemy casualties, its chance of success and main objective, its dollar
cost and duration, its location on the planet—causally impact the public’s support at
home. The first essay simultaneously measures the causal impacts of sixty features
of a war, obtaining a rough outline of the public’s calculus on war as a mathematical
function. The second essay measures the causal impacts of accumulating American
and insurgent body counts over time during a war, estimating their dynamic rate of
change. And the third essay measures the causal impacts of domestic political elites
during parallel real and hypothetical wars, discovering a new mechanism by which
the public responds to their position-taking at home.
But these measurements wouldn’t be possible without the second way these three
essays hang together: all of them employ the experimental method. These essays
iv
involve survey experiments that are atypical and nonstandard in the use of force
literature. The first essay uses a conjoint experiment, which can powerfully estimate
the causal impact of relatively many treatments with relatively few research subjects
because of its efficiency. The second essay uses a panel experiment, which can estimate
the cumulative causal impact of a dynamic treatments at many different points in time
because of its sequential structure. And the third essay uses both real and hypothetical
experiments, which can uncover how different contexts condition the estimates of
treatment impacts.
v
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Essay 1
The Equation for the Public’s War Support:
Evidence from a Conjoint Experiment
1.1 Introduction
Over the last 75 years or so researchers learned a lot about what moves the American
public’s support for war. It’s happened in roughly two methodological phases so far
that overlap in time: a first observational phase and and a second experimental phase.
What did researchers learn about the public’s war support in the observational
phase—and how did they learn it? They observed in the data available to them that
some features of a mission abroad are correlates of support for it. The first of these
features are events on the ground during a mission. Researchers initially saw that the
number of American casualties and support for a mission correlate negatively: if one
goes up the other goes down (inter alia, Mueller, 1971, 1973; Lorell et al., 1985; Lar-
son, 1996; Gartner et al., 1997; Gartner and Segura, 1998; Burk, 1999; Klarevas, 2000;
Gartner, 2008; Gelpi et al., 2009). This is the “casualties hypothesis.” And they even-
tually generalized this: the occurrence of certain events in general—not just American
casualties in particular—and support correlate negatively for “bad” events and posi-
tively for “good” events (inter alia, Mueller, 1971, 1973; Lorell et al., 1985; Jentleson,
1992; Larson, 1996; Gartner et al., 1997; Gartner and Segura, 1998; jen; Burk, 1999;
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Klarevas, 2000; Eichenberg, 2003; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Eichenberg, 2005; Gelpi
et al., 2006; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006; Fordham, 2008; Gartner, 2008; Gelpi et al.,
2009). This is the “event-response hypothesis”—a generalization of the casualties hy-
pothesis to events other than American casualties. And the second of these features
are the positions taken on a mission by partisan elites at home. Researchers saw that
the strength of partisan elites’ consensus on a mission and the public’s support for
it correlate positively: if one goes up the other also goes up (inter alia, see Belknap
and Campbell, 1951; Brody, 1991; Zaller, 1992; Larson, 1996; Berinsky, 2007, 2009;
Baum and Groeling, 2009b). This is the “elite-driven hypothesis”—although a sim-
plified description of it. Researchers learn things in the observational phase: that
events occurring on the ground—including American casualties—and the strength of
partisan elite consensus at home are both correlates—one negative and one positive—
of the public’s support for a mission. These claims lead to the event-response and
elite-driven hypotheses, respectively.
But the knowledge that researchers gained in the observational phase about the
relationships between these features of a mission—events and elites—and the public’s
support for it isn’t complete. These relationships are correlations—but they might
not be causations. And these features are correlates of support—but they might not
be its causes. Are the event-response and elite-driven hypotheses actually right in
terms of causation and not just correlation? Researchers found the answers to this
questions in the experimental phase. They observed in data from both survey and
field experiments they conducted that some features of a mission abroad are actually
causes of support for it and not just correlates. In a traditional experiment the ran-
dom assignment of subjects to be manipulated or not—like changing features such as
the number of American casualties or the strength of partisan elite consensus—in ex-
pectation means that the difference in support between those manipulated and those
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not is actually the causal impact of that manipulation (for a review of this procedure,
see Druckman et al., 2010). And many experiments revealed that indeed both the
event-response and elite-driven hypotheses are right: accumulating American casu-
alties causes support to go down while strengthening elite consensus causes support
to go up—they don’t just correlate with support going down and up, respectively.
The observational phase followed by this experimental phase closes the loop on these
claims.
But now here’s the next obvious question: do the event-response hypothesis and
the elite-driven hypothesis explain the public’s support for a mission abroad equally,
or does one explain more than the other? In other words, do events on the ground
or do the positions of elites at home affect support more? And here’s the answer,
according to the literature: it depends on what information about the war is available
to the public.
Members of the public have “accuracy goals, which motivate them to seek out
and carefully consider relevant evidence so as to reach a correct or otherwise best
conclusion” on a mission abroad (Taber and Lodge, 2006, p. 756). In doing so,
people gain the benefit of having the “correct” level of support for the war but also
incur the costs of gathering and cognitively processing that information about it—
which might include its number of American and enemy casualties, its objective and
likelihood of success, its dollar cost and duration, its theater of war, and the positions
taken on it by domestic and international political elites, among other things (also see
Kunda, 1987, 1990; Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Baumeister and Newman, 1994; Chaiken
and Trope, 1999). But people are also rational: when possible, they minimize these
information costs while maintaining the accuracy benefit (Downs, 1957).
The causal mechanism underlying the elite-driven hypothesis suggests that if po-
litical elites publicly take positions on a mission abroad, people rationally gather and
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cognitively process this special information and ignore everything else (Rahn, 1993;
Mondak, 1993a; Druckman, 2001; Cohen, 2003; Bullock, 2009; Nicholson, 2011; Hayes
and Guardino, 2011; Nicholson, 2012; Druckman et al., 2012). This happens because
these elite cues are a heuristic, or shortcut (Chaiken, 1980; Mondak, 1993b; Popkin,
1991; Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia, 1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lau and
Redlawsk, 1997; Cutler, 2002; Kam, 2005; Lau and Redlawsk, 2006; Boudreau, 2009).
People believe that elites in their party both share common interests with and are
more knowledgeable (and that elites in the other party don’t share common interests
but are more knowledgeable) than them (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). People then
infer that elites in their party have the “correct” position on the war and take it on
themselves (and that elites in the other party have the “incorrect” position and take
on the opposite one) and don’t gather nor cognitively process further information like
events on the ground—which would only add to their information cost with no addi-
tional accuracy benefit (Berinsky, 2007, 2009). So in the presence of the elite cues,
the elite-driven hypothesis should explain explain the public’s war support more than
the event-response hypothesis.
But what happens if political elites don’t publicly take positions on a mission
abroad? What happens in the absence of elite cues? The causal mechanism un-
derlying the event-driven hypothesis suggests that in this case—without a heuristic
or shortcut available—people rationally gather and cognitively process information
about war events, incurring information costs in exchange for an accuracy benefit. As
people get information, negative events—like American casualties—add to a mission’s
costs while positive events—like enemy casualties—add to its benefits (inter alia, Lar-
son, 1996; Klarevas, 2000; Gelpi et al., 2009). And the difference between the costs
from these negative events and the benefits from these positive events yields people’s
net utility—and this quantity is equivalent to their war support. Every event that
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occurs during a mission has a negative or positive impact on people’s net utility and
thus their war support. So in the absence of heuristic elite cues, the event-response
hypothesis should explain the public’s war support more than the elite-driven hy-
pothesis.
From the above, we expect one hypothesis to explains the public’s war support
more than the other depending on the information available. But further, the under-
lying causal mechanisms of both the elite-driven hypothesis and the event-response
hypothesis also imply a relationship between the public’s information and its support
for a mission abroad. And more than just any relationship: that support is a function
of information about many different elite cues and events. Could research obtain the
actual equation for this functional relationship? The equation would take information
about everything relevant the public as inputs and yield its war support as the single
output—and this means we’d need to measure the causal impacts of many things
indeed. I’ve already discussed that researchers in the experimental phase used ex-
periments to measure the causal impacts of many different elites cues and events on
support. And perhaps experiments could measure the causal impacts of other things
on support, too. This could work but I argue here that it’s a suboptimal method to
reach this research goal.
What’s wrong with using experiments to measure the causal impacts of everything
about war on the public’s support? An experiment needs a separate group of new
subjects for each thing whose causal impact researchers intend to measure. Say
researchers want to use an experiment to measure the causal impact on support
in moving from zero to ten American casualties. Here they’ll need two groups of
subjects: one that sees zero American casualties and one that sees ten. But say
they’re also interested in what a hundred American casualties does. Here they’ll need
to add another group of subjects. But say they’re also interested in what a thousand
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American casualties does. Here they’ll need to add yet another. This addition goes so
on for every level of casualties that interests them. And this addition also happens for
all the many things that interest them besides various levels of American casualties.
Say researchers want to use an experiment to measure the causal impact on support
for 100 different things about war—so they’ll need over 100 groups of subjects. But
this isn’t a feasible number of groups for an experiment.
But there’s another way besides traditional experiments to measure the causal
impacts of everything about war on the public’s support. Hainmueller et al. (2014)
develops a new technique called a conjoint experiment and an accompanying estima-
tion procedure using data produced from it. In a conjoint experiment respondents
participate in a sequence of choice tasks. In each choice task they face two “profiles”
randomly generated from a collection features and must indicate which profile they
prefer. And most importantly: regardless of the number of features, researchers can
accurately and precisely estimate the causal impact of each and every one of these
features without needing to increase the number of subjects. For example Hainmueller
and Hopkins (2015) has only 1,407 respondents choose which of two randomly gen-
erated potential immigrants they’d prefer to see admitted into the United States
and estimates the casual impact of 50 different features of potential immigrants. And
Hainmueller et al. (2014) has only 311 respondents choose which of two randomly gen-
erated presidential candidates they’d prefer to see elected and estimates the causal
impact of 40 different features of presidential candidates. And here I have only 487
respondents choose which of two randomly generated missions abroad they’d approve
of more and estimate the casual impact of 60 different features of a mission abroad.
Measuring these causal impacts using a traditional experiment would require at least
60 groups which isn’t feasible.
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Of course, the conjoint experiment that Hainmueller et al. (2014) develops is sim-
ply a newer and specific version of an older and general approach called conjoint
analysis that was developed by both marketing researchers (e.g., Green and Rao,
1971) and sociologists (e.g., Jasso and Rossi, 1977). Conjoint analysis as a general
approach—with the conjoint experiment as a specific version of it—estimates the
impact—but not necessarily the causal impact as in the conjoint experiment—of fea-
tures on respondents’ choices and ratings of profiles (see Wallander, 2009; Raghavarao
et al., 2011). And while the conjoint experiment of Hainmueller et al. (2014) involves
randomly generated profiles of features and the estimation of average marginal com-
ponent effects (AMCEs) that are the causal impacts of those features, this is not the
case in all the versions of conjoint analysis, some versions of which involve determin-
istically generated profiles of features and the estimation of different quantities of
interest that are just correlative impacts of those features. Hainmueller et al. (2014)
claims to study the impacts of profile features from “a causal inference perspective”
and uses “the potential outcomes framework of causal inference to formally analyze
the causal properties of conjoint analysis” (p. 3; also see Neyman, 1923; Rubin, 1974).
In this paper, I make the first attempt in the literature to obtain a rough outline of
the public’s calculus on war as a mathematical function by simultaneously measuring
the causal impacts of sixty features of a war. I do so using the technique of the
conjoint experiment and its accompanying estimation procedure from Hainmueller
et al. (2014). The development of this method makes my attempt possible and the use
of this method here represents the first application of it in the use of force literature.
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1.2 A Conjoint Experiment
Similar to Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) I conducted a conjoint experiment on the
Qualtrics survey platform from January 19, 2015 to January 22, 2015 and recruited
a sample of 487 subjects from the Amazon Mechanical Turk marketplace. The sur-
vey first asked respondents the ANES 7-point partisan identification questions and
questions on age, education, income, foreign policy knowledge, marital status, race,
sex, and state. The survey then presented respondents with a choice task repeated
five times which essentially made respondents choose between two randomly gener-
ated missions abroad the mission that they preferred more. I summarize this choice
task below and Figure 1.1 gives a screenshot of how one instance of this choice task
appeared to respondents.
• Each choice task first asked respondents to “please review the two missions
detailed below, then please answer the questions.”
• Each choice task then presented respondents with two randomly generated mis-
sions. Specifically respondents viewed a table with three columns. The first
column lists—in an order randomized for each respondent and maintained for
all five repetitions—ten attributes of missions: American casualties, chance of
success, cost in dollars, Democratic leaders in Congress, duration, enemy casual-
ties, main objective, region, Republican leaders in Congress, and United Nations
Security Council. The second column titled “Mission 1” gives on each row a
randomly chosen value for each corresponding attribute in the first column—
from a pre-specified set of values that an attribute can take. The third column
title “Mission 2” does the same thing. For example the attribute American
casualties can take the values “0,” “10,” “100,” “1,000,” “10,000,” “100,000,”
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or “1,000,000.” Table 1.1 summarizes the ten attributes of missions considered
here and their possible values.
• Each choice task then asked respondents “if you had to choose between the two,
which of these two missions abroad would you say you approve of more” with
answers “Mission 1” or “Mission 2.”
Figure 1.1. Choice task. This is a screenshot of how one instance of this choice task appeared
to respondents on Qualtrics.
The coding and analysis of data from this conjoint experiment is straightforward.
The unit of observation here is a randomly generated mission and not a respondent.
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Attributes Values
American casualties 0
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
Chance of success 10%
25%
50%
75%
90%
100%
Cost in dollars $1 million (0.001 billion)
$10 million (0.01 billion)
$100 million (0.1 billion)
$1 billion
$10 billion
$100 billion
$1 trillion (1,000 billion)
$10 trillion (10,000 billion)
Democratic leaders in Congress No position
Oppose
Support
Duration 1 month
3 months
6 months
1 year
3 years
5 years
10 years
20 years
Enemy casualties 0
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
1,000,000
Main objective Attack on ally
Civil war
Famine
Food and medicine
Military rulers
Relief supplies
Troop withdrawal
Warring factions
Region Africa
Central America
Eastern Europe
Middle East
South America
Southeast Asia
Republican leaders in Congress No position
Oppose
Support
United Nations Security Council No position
Oppose
Support
Table 1.1. Attributes and values. This table lists the attributes of a hypothetical mission
abroad in the choice task and the possible values that each attribute could randomly take on from
a pre-specified set of values.
Recall that there are 487 respondents who each complete 5 choice tasks that each
consist of choosing between 2 randomly generated missions. This means that there are
10
4,870 randomly generated missions. The dependent variable is a dummy for whether
a mission is chosen or not. Each independent variable is a dummy for whether a
mission has a particular value of an attribute relative to some baseline value for that
attribute. For example one independent variable is a dummy for whether a mission
has 10 American casualties relative to a baseline 0 American casualties. The 60 values
across the 10 attributes for a mission can be represented by 50 dummy variables and 10
excluded baseline categories—so there are 50 independent variables. Ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression with clustered standard errors yields the desired results.
Each coefficient in the resulting regression equation is the average causal impact on
the probability respondents choose a mission resulting from that mission having a
particular value for an attribute—the value of the attribute corresponding to that
coefficient—relative to the baseline value of the attribute. Figure 1.2 summarizes
these coefficients and causal impacts—and the remainder of the paper unpacks these.
The randomization of attribute values in “profiles”—here missions—implies or-
thogonality of the attributes. And this orthogonality further implies that all profiles
with one particular value of an attribute—say 1,000,000 American casualties—and all
profiles with another—say zero American casualties—have the same distribution of all
the other attribute values in expectation. This means that the average causal impact
of moving from one particular value—again say 1,000,000 American casualties—of an
attribute to another—again say zero American casualties—is simply the difference
in the proportion of times respondents choose profiles with the first value of the at-
tribute compared to the proportion of times they choose profiles with the second one.
Hainmueller et al. (2014) calls this difference in proportions—or means—the average
marginal component effect (AMCE) and shows that “the AMCE represents of the
average difference in the probability of being preferred [...] when comparing two at-
tribute values [...] where the average is taken over all other possible combinations of
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Figure 1.2. Causal impacts in general. This figure plots the causal impact (point estimate
of AMCE) of each attribute value on the probability that an average respondent prefers a mission.
90% confidence bands and each point without error bars is a baseline value for an attribute.
[...] attributes” (p.537). The same paper shows that that “the AMCE is nonparamet-
rically identified given the conditionally independent randomization of the attributes
and can be easily estimated using a regression of the binary outcome variable [...] on
sets of indicator variables measuring the levels of each attribute. The advantage of
this approach is that the estimator for the AMCEs is fully nonparametric and does
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not require functional form assumptions about the choice probabilities.” I estimate
the average causal impacts—AMCEs—of a mission’s attribute values in the conjoint
experiment using this approach.
What about external validity here? There are two main threats to the exter-
nal validity of the results from this conjoint experiment: the representativeness of
its Mechanical Turk sample and the artificiality of its setting and its randomly as-
signed treatments—or more specifically, the choice task and the randomly chosen
values of a mission’s attributes. On the first point, recent research argues that the
results of survey experiments with subject samples collected via Mechanical Turk
are both internally and externally valid for answering research questions emerging
in political science (Berinsky et al., 2012) as well as in economics and psychology
(Buhrmester et al., 2011; Horton et al., 2011). Particularly with respect to generaliz-
ability, Berinsky et al. (2012) shows that samples recruited via Mechanical Turk are
more representative than undergraduate convenience samples but only slightly less
representative than internet and national probability samples (also see Ipeirotis, 2010;
Ross et al., 2010; Paolacci et al., 2010). I paid $0.10 to each subject upon completion
of the panel experiment. Buhrmester et al. (2011) shows that the payment amount
does not affect the quality of subjects’ responses (also see Mason and Watts, 2009;
Chen and Horton, 2010; Horton and Chilton, 2010).
On the second point, Barabas and Jerit (2010) shows that the average treatment
effects (ATEs) in survey experiments are smaller in magnitude but have the same di-
rectional sign as ATEs in otherwise equivalent field experiments. So sufficiently large
and statistically significant ATEs in artificial settings—like survey experiments—
suggest that there would be also be smaller but still statistically significant ATEs
in natural settings—like field experiments. And so experiments’ settings condition
the causal impacts of treatments but don’t threaten their generalizability. The same
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goes for conjoint experiments: they are a type of survey experiment and average
marginal component effects (AMCEs) of attribute values are analogous to ATEs in
survey experiments.
Are the results from conjoint experiments externally valid for the same reasons
that survey experiments are? Unfortunately, there’s an additional complication in
a conjoint experiment that’s not in a typical survey experiment: the choice task
might be psychologically artificial rather than realistic. Recall the choice task in
this paper’s conjoint experiment: respondents immediately see two missions abroad
consisting of ten attributes each randomly picked from a corresponding pre-specified
set, and then respondents choose which of the two missions that they prefer. This
choice task might threaten the external validity of the results from the conjoint exper-
iment. Respondents gather and cognitively process ten pieces of information about
each mission immediately. But the mechanisms of the two major theories about how
information affects public opinion—the receive-accept-sample (RAS) model and the
online-processing model—expect people to gather and cognitively process informa-
tion over time in the real world, not all at once as they do in the choice task. So
the literature’s dynamic mechanisms might not be operative in the static choice task
because they’re incompatible—perhaps a related set of time-compressed mechanisms
are operative instead. At the very least, the conjoint experiment’s choice task primes
respondents to make decisions using cost-benefit analysis—rendering their war sup-
port more rational than it would be otherwise. But this might be a research tradeoff
worth making in order to obtain a rough outline of the equation for the public’s sup-
port for war—even one that overstates public’s rationality. Hainmueller and Hopkins
(2015) certainly thought so and did the same with immigration.
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1.3 American and Enemy Casualties
How does the number of American casualties affect the probability that respondents
prefer a mission abroad? How much casualty sensitivity is there: “the overall willing-
ness of the public to continue to support a military operation even as the human toll
is rising” (Gelpi et al., 2009, p. 8). Figure 1.3 makes three points about this.
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Figure 1.3. Causal impacts of American casualties. This figure plots the causal impact
(point estimate of AMCE) of the level of American casualties on the probability that an average
respondent prefers a mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline is zero casualties.
First, “casualty phobia” occurs when the public only supports a mission abroad
with nonzero casualties (for a review, see Gelpi et al., 2009). A public with casu-
alty phobia stops supporting a military operation when the first casualty happens.
Figure 1.3 shows that respondents don’t have casualty phobia. Moving from 0 to
10 casualties reduces the probability that respondents prefer a mission by 3 points
and isn’t significant (SE = 2.5). This fact means that respondents’ support doesn’t
drop—and doesn’t jump—between the first and tenth casualty. But moving from 0 to
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100 casualties reduces the probability that respondents prefer a mission by 5 points
and is significant (SE = 2.6). Combined these two facts suggest that respondents’
support finally drops sometime between the eleventh and hundredth casualty. Polit-
ical leaders can adopt policies and the military can behave in ways that incur up to
ten casualties—and somewhere between eleven and a hundred—without losing any
support for a mission abroad.
Second, the public is “casualty sensitive” if it “views casualties as a negative,
preferring less if possible” (Gelpi et al., 2009, p. 8). This implies that as casualties
increase the public decreases its support for a mission abroad (inter alia, Mueller, 1971,
1973; Lorell et al., 1985; Larson, 1996; Gartner et al., 1997; Gartner and Segura, 1998;
Burk, 1999; Klarevas, 2000; Gartner, 2008; Gelpi et al., 2009). The real question is not
whether the public is casualty sensitive—and scholars agree it is—but how casualty
sensitive it is—and scholars disagree on the answer. The public is less casualty
sensitive—“casualty tolerant”—if “casualties do not substantially undermine public
support for mission.” The public is more casualty sensitive—“casualty tolerant”—if
“casualties do substantially undermine public support for a mission.” Which is it?
I borrow the concept of an elasticity from economics and use it to operationalize—
and quantify—casualty sensitivity. An elasticity is the ratio of how much one variable
changes in response to how much another variable changes (see Mas-Colell et al.,
1995). A canonical one from economics is a good’s price elasticity of demand—the
ratio of how much the quantity demanded of the good changes in response to how
much the good’s price changes. Now I apply this here. A possible measure of casualty
sensitivity is “casualty elasticity of support”—the ratio of much the mission’s support
decreases in response to how much the mission’s casualties increase. The public is
casualty shy when its casualty elasticity of support is high—for a given increase in
casualties, support for a mission decreases a lot. And the public is casualty tolerant
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when its casualty elasticity of support is low—for a given increase in casualties, sup-
port for a mission decreases a little. Of course the terms “high” and “a lot,” “low”
and “a little” in this abstract description are relative so a concrete computation of
casualty elasticities from the results may help.
Moving from zero to non-zero casualties reduces the probability that respondents
prefer a mission by some number of points in a significant way—with the one ex-
ception of moving from 0 to 10 casualties, which causes a 3-point but insignificant
reduction. And larger movements in casualties cause greater reductions in prefer-
ence probability. Figure 1.3 summarize these movements and reductions. This is
evidence that respondents are casualty sensitive. But what is the casualty elasticity
of support in each of the implicit casualty ranges—0 to 10, 10 to 100, 100 to 1,000,
1,000 to 10,000, 10,000 to 100,000, 100,000 to 1,000,000? How casualty sensitive are
respondents?
I show how I compute casualty elasticity of support in each given casualty range by
way of example. The first 100 casualties reduce the probability that respondents prefer
a mission by 5 points—the point estimate moving from 0 to 100 casualties (SE = 2.6).
And the first 1,000 casualties reduce the probability by 16 points—the point estimate
moving from 0 to 1,000 casualties (SE = 2.8). This implies that the 900 casualties
from the 101st to the 1,000th reduce the probability by 11 points from 5 points to
16 points. With this fact it’s straightforward to compute the casualty elasticity—
the ratio of how much the mission’s support decreases in response to how much its
casualties increase—in the 100 to 1,000 casualty range. The casualty elasticity comes
out to 0.012222—a decrease in 11 points divided by an increase in 900 casualties
(and taking the absolute value to make it positive). Another way of interpreting
this casualty elasticity is that there’s a 0.012222 decrease in the probability that
respondents prefer a mission per casualty incurred in the 101 to 1,000 casualty range—
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and that’s how sensitive respondents are to casualties there. Table 1.2 summarizes
the casualty elasticity of support for all the possible ranges in this study.
Casualty Range Casualty Elasticity
0 - 10 0.300000
10 - 100 0.022222
100 - 1,000 0.012222
1,000 - 10,000 0.000444
10,000 - 100,000 0.000100
100,000 - 1,000,000 0.000013
Table 1.2. Casualty elasticity of support. This table lists the casualty elasticity of support in
each range of a mission’s American casualties.
Table 1.2 shows that as casualties increase the casualty elasticity of support—
casualty sensitivity—decreases. In the 1-10 casualty range respondents have a casu-
alty elasticity of 0.3 and reduce their probability of preferring a mission by 0.3 per
casualty. But in the 100,000-1,000,000 casualty range respondents have a casualty
elasticity of 0.00001 and reduce their probability by just 0.00001 per casualty. This
means that later in a mission when there’s more than 100,000 casualties respondents
value each casualty 30,000 times less than they do later when there’s less than 10
casualties. The public’s casualty sensitivity starts high and ends low—here 30,000
times lower. The point of Table 1.2: war collapses how the public values lives lost—
here collapsing by a factor of 30,000. The public values the first life lost the most and
the last life lost the least—respondents here valuing the first casualty as much as the
last 30,000. The public swings from casualty shy to casualty tolerant as casualties
mount.
Third, the number of casualties has the potential to change public support for a
mission abroad the most. Moving from 0 to 1,000,000 casualties reduces the probabil-
ity that respondents prefer a mission by 41 points and is significant (SE = 2.6)—the
largest movement in this study. And a mission’s cost in dollars and its likelihood of
success have the second and third most potential to change public support but just
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half the potential of casualties. Moving from $1 million to $10 trillion in cost reduces
support by 23 points (SE = 2.6) and moving from a 10% to a 100% success likelihood
raises support by 20 points (SE = 2.4)—the second and third largest movements in
this study but only half of the 41-point move in support in going from 0 to 1,000,000
casualties. When the public has full information about a mission abroad—about its
number of American casualties, its number of enemy casualties, its cost in dollars, its
anticipated duration, its location, its objective, its likelihood of success, its support
among domestic and international political elites—the number of American casualties
changes the public’s support for a mission abroad more than anything else. American
casualties are the prime mover of war support.
Now what about the number of enemy casualties? Do they affect the probability
that respondents prefer a mission abroad? Does the public view enemy casualties
“as a reasonable indicator of success” that can “contextualize U.S. casualties in the
hopes that high ratios of Iraqi deaths to U.S. deaths will reduce the negative impact of
American losses” and “as a yardstick—measuring both the success of the battle and
the relative significance of U.S. casualties” (Boettcher and Cobb, 2006, p. 833)? Do
enemy casualties measure a mission’s success or contextualize its American casualties
for the public (also see Gartner and Myers, 1995; Burk, 1999)? This implies that
as enemy casualties increase the public increases its support for a mission abroad.
But Figure 1.4 shows that this doesn’t happen among respondents. Moving from
zero enemy casualties to any other number of them fails to change the probability
that respondents prefer a mission in either a substantively or statistically significant
way. This null result may stem from two things. First, respondents already have
explicit information that measures a mission’s success—the likelihood of success as a
percentage—and infer it from implicit information available—the number of enemy
casualties. Second, respondents have eight other pieces of information that they
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use to contextualize American casualties besides enemy casualties. When the public
has full information about a mission abroad it measures success and contextualizes
American casualties with things other than enemy casualties—discounting or even
ignoring them so that they don’t change support. The public doesn’t care about
enemy casualties when it knows so much more than that about a mission.
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Figure 1.4. Causal impacts of enemy casualties. This figure plots the causal impact (point
estimate of AMCE) of each level of enemy casualties on the probability that an average respondent
prefers a mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline is zero casualties.
1.4 Chance of Success & Main Objective
How does a mission’s likelihood of success affect the probability that respondents
prefer that mission? Do the public’s “expectations of success matter the most [...]
when it comes to supporting an ongoing military in the face of a mounting human toll”
(Gelpi et al., 2009, p. 2)? And does “the public’s expectations of whether the mission
will be successful trump other considerations” that “affect the robustness of support”
(Gelpi et al., 2009, p. 2; also see Eichenberg, 2005)? A public doing these two things
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would increase its support for a mission abroad when it believes the likelihood of
the mission’s success increases—given the number of American casualties. Figure 1.5
shows that respondents act this way. Moving from the 10% baseline chance of success
to a 25%, 50%, 75%, 90% or 100% chance raises the probability respondents prefer a
mission by 4 points (SE = 2.3), 11 points (SE = 2.4), 15 points (SE = 2.4), 16 points
(SE = 2.4), and 20 points (SE = 2.4), respectively and significantly so. Respondents’
support for a mission increases as the chance of success does—almost in a straight
line.
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Figure 1.5. Causal impacts of chance of success. This figure plots the causal impact (point
estimate of AMCE) of the chance of a mission’s success on the probability that an average respondent
prefers it. 90% confidence bands and the baseline is a 10% chance of success.
Just how straight-line is the relationship between support for a mission among
respondents and the chance of success? The “success elasticity of support”—the
ratio of how much the mission’s support increases in response to how much its chance
of success increases—answers this question. Table 1.3 gives the success elasticity of
support across all success ranges. (The previous section gives an explanation of what
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an elasticity is and how to compute it.) In the 10-25% success range respondents
have a success elasticity of 0.27 and raise their probability of preferring a mission
by 0.27 points per point increase in success likelihood. And in the 90-100% success
range respondents have a success elasticity of 0.2 and raise their probability by 0.20
points per point increase in success likelihood. For missions with the highest success
likelihood the public values each point of success likelihood by a little less than they do
for mission with the lowest success likelihood—here just a quarter less. The public’s
“success sensitivity”—the value of a point of success likelihood gained—declines just
a little over nearly the entire range of success likelihood—here by just a quarter. The
public loves a better chance for a mission’s success the same no matter how big the
chance of success is already.
Success Chance Range Success Elasticity
10% - 25% 0.27
25% - 50% 0.28
50% - 75% 0.16
75% - 90% 0.20
90% - 100% 0.20
Table 1.3. Success elasticity of support. This table lists the success elasticity of support in
each range of a mission’s chance of success.
Table 1.3 has another interesting result. Moving from a 90% chance of success
to a 100% chance raises respondents’ support by only 2 extra points. This isn’t just
any 10-point increase in the chance of success—it’s a 10-point increase in the chance
of success that eliminates the risk that a mission fails and guarantees that a mission
succeeds. But respondents value an extra point of success likelihood the same—at 0.2
extra points of support—when going from a 90% chance of success to a 100% chance
as they do going from a 75% chance to a 90% chance. Respondents don’t reward a
mission that’s certain to succeed with any premium on support for it. This extends
my point in the last paragraph: the public always loves a better chance for a mission’s
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success the same—whether the mission already got a small chance, a big chance, or
a guaranteed chance of success.
Now what about the mission’s objective? Does it affect the probability that
respondents prefer a mission abroad? Does “the most powerful and parsimonious
explanation for the variations in public support in the post-Cold War era continue to
be found in the variable of the principal policy objective (PPO) for which military
force is being used” (Jentleson and Britton, 1998, p. 396)? This “PPO theory” splits
the possible objectives for a mission abroad into three categories (also see Jentleson,
1992; Eichenberg, 2005; Gelpi et al., 2009, chp. 8).
• Foreign policy restraint, or FPR: “force used to coerce FPR by an adversary
engaged in aggressive actions against the United States, its citizens, or its in-
terests”(Jentleson and Britton, 1998, p. 397).
• Internal political change, or IPC: “force used to try to engineer IPC in another
country’s government, whether as support for an existing government consid-
ered an ally or an effort to overthrow a government considered an adversary”
(Jentleson and Britton, 1998, p. 397).
• Humanitarian intervention, or HI: “ the provision of emergency relief through
military and other means to people suffering from famine or other gross and
widespread humanitarian disasters” (Jentleson and Britton, 1998, p. 399-400).
First the PPO theory claims that the public perceives missions with an FPR
or HI objective as more legitimate—more obedient to international law—and more
efficacious—clearer standards of success—than those with an IPC objective (Jentleson
and Britton, 1998; Eichenberg, 2005). And the public rewards FPR and HI missions
for this with extra support over IPC missions. But second the PPO theory doesn’t
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say anything definitive about the public’s support for FPR missions compared to
HI missions—just that “we may not find a fixed preference pattern between HI and
FPR but postulate that their levels of support should be more similar than different
and that the differences between them should be less than either’s difference with
IPC”(Jentleson and Britton, 1998, p. 400).
This study has three possible objectives under each of the three categories of ob-
jectives FPR, HI, and IPC. The FPR objectives are “stopping an aggressor’s attack
on an ally” (attack on ally), “forcing an aggressor to withdraw troops from a coun-
try” (troop withdrawal), and “stopping the regional and local threat to security from
an aggressor using nuclear weapons against a country” (nuclear weapons). The HI
objectives are “delivering relief supplies to a country” (relief supplies), “distributing
food and medicine in a country” (food and medicine), and “ending starvation from
famine in a country” (famine). The IPC objectives are “disarming warring factions
in a country” (warring factions), “stopping the civil war in a country” (civil war),
and “ousting military rulers and reinstalling the democratically elected leaders in a
country” (military rulers). Do respondents act like the PPO theory says they should?
Do respondents support missions with the FPR and HI objectives of attack on
ally, troop withdrawal, nuclear weapons, relief supplies, food and medicine, and famine
more than those with the IPC objectives of warring factions, civil war, and military
rulers? Figure 1.6 shows that this happens—mostly. Moving from the attack on ally
baseline objective to nuclear weapons, relief supplies, food and medicine, famine, or
warring factions changes the probability respondents prefer a mission by -1 points
(SE = 3.0), +3 points (SE = 2.8), +0 points (SE = 2.9), +3 points (SE = 2.9),
and -3 points (SE = 2.9), respectively but not significantly so. This implies that
respondents support missions with these objectives—two with FPR, all three with
HI, and just one with IPC—all the same in a statistical sense. And moving from
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the attack on ally baseline objective to troop withdrawal, civil war, or military rulers
reduces respondents’ support for a mission by 7 (SE = 2.8), 9 points (SE = 2.9), and 6
points (SE = 2.9), respectively and significantly so. And this implies that respondents
support missions with these objectives—just one with FPR, two with IPC—less than
those in the previous list.
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Figure 1.6. Causal impacts of a mission’s main objective. This figure plots the causal
impact (point estimate of AMCE) of the mission’s main objective on the probability that an average
respondent prefers a mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline is stopping an aggressor’s
attack on an ally.
This all means two things. First with one exception—the FPR objective troop
withdrawal—respondents support missions with the FPR and HI objectives the same.
Second, again with one exception—the IPC objective warring factions—respondents
support missions with IPC objectives less than those with FPR and HI objectives.
These two findings add evidence to the PPO theory but also suggest that people may
respond to the specific mission objectives like troop withdrawal and warring factions
in ways that their respective mission categories FPR and IPC don’t indicate under
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the PPO theory. Future research should update the PPO theory—which appears
correct in general here—to account for this. The public likes using force abroad to
stop aggressors and to help people—but not to make or break governments.
1.5 Dollar Cost & Duration
How does a mission’s dollar affect the probability that respondents prefer it? Is
the public “dollar cost sensitive” just like it is “casualty sensitive”—does the public
respond to dollar cost the same way it does to the “human cost of war”—American
casualties—“as a negative, preferring less if possible” and decreasing its support for a
mission abroad as casualties increase (Gelpi et al., 2009)? And if so how “dollar cost
sensitive” is it? So far scholars haven’t answered these questions directly except for
showing that the public supports missions that help them economically more than
those that don’t (Fordham, 2008). But there’s a germ for an argument here: this
suggests that the public supports missions that hurt them economically less than
those that don’t and in proportion. And a mission’s dollar cost hurts the public
economically—and bigger dollar cost inflicts greater hurt. This syllogism concludes
that the public is “cost sensitive”—it prefers lower dollar cost if possible and decreases
its support for a mission abroad as dollar cost increases.
I don’t quantify the exact dollar cost sensitivity of respondents by calculating their
“dollar cost elasticity of support” because an elasticity doesn’t make sense here—like
it does with casualties and the chance of success—because the effect of dollar costs on
respondents’ support across its range doesn’t change smoothly. Figure 1.7 shows this.
Moving from the $1 million baseline cost to $10 million, $100 million, or $1 billion
reduces the probability that respondents prefer a mission by only 2 points (SE = 2.7),
5 points (SE = 2.6), or 2 points (SE = 2.7), respectively, but not significantly except
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for the middle case. But moving from the $1 million baseline cost to $10 billion,
$100 billion, $1 trillion, or $10 trillion reduces respondents’ support for a mission by
7 points (SE = 2.6), 14 points (SE = 2.7), 13 points (SE = 2.8), and 23 points (SE
= 2.6), respectively, and significantly so. This means that dollar costs less than $1
billion for a mission don’t reduce respondents’ support for it but dollars costs above
$1 billion do—a threshold.
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Figure 1.7. Causal impacts of a mission’s dollar cost. This figure plots the causal impact
(point estimate of AMCE) of the mission’s dollar cost on the probability that an average respondent
prefers a mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline is zero dollars in cost.
Above this threshold the penalty starts with a 7 point drop from a $10 billion cost
but jumps to a 13 or 14 point drop from a $100 billion or $1 trillion cost—a ten or
one hundred fold cost increase only doubles the damage. And the penalty jumps to
a 23 point drop from $10 trillion cost—a ten fold cost increase only about doubles
the damage—yet again. For context this 23-point drop in support going from a $1
million cost to a $10 trillion cost is the second-largest movement in the study but
still only about half the first largest one—the 41-point drop in support going from
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0 to 1,000,000 casualties. In fact the penalty for a $10 trillion cost and only 10,000
casualties is the same relative to their baselines. The public doesn’t like losing money
on missions abroad—especially amounts over $1 billion—but it hates losing American
soldiers even more.
How does a mission’s duration affect the probability that respondents prefer it?
Is the public “time sensitive” just like it is “dollar cost sensitive”? I claim that the
same logic that explains the public’s dollar sensitivity explains its time sensitivity—
and predicts a similar pattern of impacts. The public only has so many dollars to
spend (and what they represent). So in spending dollars on a mission abroad the
public consumes a scarce resource. By definition doing so hurts the public econom-
ically but might help it by yielding benefits. And there’s even more harm here in
the form of opportunity cost. The public foregoes spending these dollars and these
scarce resources in ways other than war—trading civilian spending for military spend-
ing, guns for butter. Similarly, the military also has only so much time to spend on
missions—another scarce resource like dollars. So spending time on a particular mis-
sion hurts the public twice in an economic way: it depletes the military’s time stock
and forces the public to give up other missions. As argued in a paragraph above the
public supports missions that hurt them economically less than those that don’t and
in proportion (Fordham, 2008). And as argued in this paragraph a mission’s dura-
tion hurts the public economically—and longer durations inflict greater hurt. This
syllogism concludes that the public is “time sensitive”—it prefers shorter duration
if possible and decreases its support for a mission abroad as its duration increases.
Parallel logic explains the impacts of both a mission’s dollar cost and duration on the
public’s support.
The effect of duration on respondents’ support across its range changes even less
smoothly than that for dollar cost—rendering “time elasticity of support” useless for
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quantifying respondents’ time sensitivity. Figure 1.8 shows this. Moving from the 1
month baseline duration to 3 months, 6 months, 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years changes
the probability that respondents prefer a mission by only +3 points (SE = 2.7), +1
point (SE = 2.7), -2 points (SE = 2.6), -3 points (SE = 2.7), and -4 points (SE = 2.7),
respectively, but not significantly. But moving from the 1 month baseline duration
to 10 years or 20 years reduces respondents’ support by 5 points (SE = 2.6) and
8 points (SE = 2.6), respectively. This means that durations 5 years or less don’t
reduce respondents’ support for it but durations 10 years or more do—a threshold
somewhere between 5 years and 10 years. Both a mission’s duration and its dollar
cost must reach minima before they have any impact on respondents’ support.
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Figure 1.8. Causal impacts of a mission’s duration. This figure plots the causal impact
(point estimate of AMCE) of the mission’s duration on the probability that an average respondent
prefers a mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline is 1 month’s duration.
Above this threshold the penalty starts with a 5 point drop from a 10 year duration
but increases to an 8 point drop from a 20 year duration—a doubling of duration
from the second-longest duration tested in this study to the first-longest one doesn’t
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quite double the damage. For context this 8-point drop in support going from a 1
month duration to a 20 year duration is only about half the second-largest one in this
study—the 23-point drop in support going from a $1 million to a $10 trillion cost.
The penalty for an 8 year duration, a $10 billion cost, and 100 casualties are all about
the same relative to their baselines. The public doesn’t like losing time on missions
abroad—those over 10 years—but it hates losing money even more and hates losing
American soldiers the most.
1.6 Region
Does the theater of war matter? Does where a mission abroad takes place change the
probability that respondents prefer it? Consider two missions exactly identical—in
their number of American and enemy casualties, in their objectives and likelihoods
of success, in their dollar costs and durations, and in the position-taking of domestic
and international political elites—except that one takes place in the Middle East, the
other in South America. Which gets more support from the public? How about Africa
versus Southeast Asia? Eastern Europe versus Central America? It’s an interesting
question that the literature on the use of force hasn’t rigorously addressed but I do
here.
Figure 1.9 suggests the answer to this question is no—at least among respondents
here. Moving from the baseline theater of war—Africa—to any other—Eastern Eu-
rope, Central America, Middle East, Southeast Asia, South America—fails to change
the probability that respondents prefer a mission abroad in either a substantively or
statistically significant way. The public doesn’t care about where America wages war.
But I qualify this null results in the same way as I do for enemy casualties. In this
study respondents already as-if have full information about a mission abroad because
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Figure 1.9. Causal impacts of a mission’s region. This figure plots the causal impact (point
estimate of AMCE) of the mission’s region on the probability that an average respondent prefers a
mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline is Africa.
of eight other facts they know about it—American casualties, enemy casualties, ob-
jective, likelihood of success, dollar cost, duration, and the positions of Democrat and
Republican leaders in Congress and the United Nations Security Council—and which
they can use to as-if calculate their support for it. It’s possible that respondents
discount or even ignore a mission’s theater—just like they seem to do so with enemy
casualties—when they know so much else about the war that’s important to them in
making a decision about it. Perhaps respondents value these unimportant facts when
important ones aren’t available to them—and they can use the former to infer the
latter. A future study should adjudicate this. But for now I conclude that the public
doesn’t care about theater of war when it knows so much else about a mission.
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1.7 Elite Cues
How do elite cues affect the probability that respondents prefer a mission abroad? Do
the positions—opposition or support—of domestic and international political elites
on a mission cue the public about which positions it should take? Does the public
actually change—and how does it change—its positions on the mission after seeing
these elites’ positions?
In brief “elite cue theory” and its extensions say that people change their position
on a mission in three possible ways after they see some elites’ position on it (inter
alia, Belknap and Campbell, 1951; Brody, 1991; Zaller, 1992; Larson, 1996; Berinsky,
2007, 2009; Baum and Groeling, 2009b). What people do depends on who these elites
are.
• People take on the same position as these elites do if they think both that the
elites know more about the mission than them and that the elites share their
interests. Here these elites are knowledgeable and friendly.
• People take on the opposite position from the one these elites do if they think
that the elites know more about the mission than them but that the elites don’t
share their interests. Here these elites are knowledgeable but unfriendly.
• People keep their initial position if they think that these elites don’t know
more about the mission than them regardless of whether the elites share their
interests or not. Here these elites are unknowledgeable and it doesn’t matter
whether they’re friendly or unfriendly.
This all means two things occur when people see some elites’ position on a mis-
sion (Chaiken, 1980; Mondak, 1993b; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia,
1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Kam, 2005; Lau and
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Redlawsk, 2006; Boudreau, 2009). People only change their position if the elites are
knowledgeable. And given that they’re knowledgeable, people take the same position
as friendly elites and the opposite position from unfriendly elites. Knowledge allows
movement. Friendliness directs it.
Who do people think knowledgeable on such missions abroad? Partisan leaders in
Congress and the United Nations Security Council? Yes, among others—according
to the literature on elite cues. This means that people change their position on the
mission when they see the position of either partisan leaders or the Security Council.
So there’s movement—but in which direction?
Do people think partisan leaders or the Security Council unfriendly or friendly? It
depends on people’s own partisanship—again, according to the literature on elite cues.
First, people think congressional leaders with the same partisanship are friendly and
those with differing partisanship are unfriendly. This means that when Republicans
see the position of Republican leaders in Congress they take it too. And when they
see the position of Democrat leaders they take the position opposite from it (Berinsky,
2007, 2009). The logic is the same for Democrats. When Democrats see the position
of Democrat leaders they take it too. And when they see the position of Republican
leaders they take the position opposite from it. Second, people regardless of their
partisanship think that the Security Council is friendly because “the US public is
internationalist in general” (Grieco et al., 2011, p. 565). But Democrats think the
Security Council is friendlier than Republicans do because they’re “members of the
American public who value the institution” and international organizations more
(Grieco et al., 2011, p. 564). This means that when people see the position of the
Security Council, Democrats move closer to its position than Republicans do (also see
Chapman and Reiter, 2004; Voeten, 2005; Thompson, 2006, 2009; Chapman, 2007,
2009; Fang, 2008). Do Figures 1.10, 1.11, and 1.12 bear all of this out? It’s mixed.
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First take the domestic elites here in Figures 1.10 and 1.11. How do Republicans
respond to position-taking by partisan leaders in Congress? Moving from the baseline
of Republican leaders not taking a position on a mission abroad to them opposing
or to them supporting it changes the probability that these Republicans prefer it by
-5 points (SE = 3.0) and +5 points (SE = 2.9), respectively—these impacts fall just
short of statistical significance. And moving from the baseline of Democrat leaders not
taking a position to them opposing or supporting it changes support by -2 points (SE
= 3.3) and +4 points (SE = 2.9) but not significantly. This means that Republicans
take the same position on a mission abroad as the one Republican leaders in Congress
do when they see it—as elite cute theory predicts. But Republicans don’t change their
position when they see the one Democrat leaders take—but elite cue theory predicts
that they take the opposite position.
And how do Democrats respond to position-taking by partisan leaders in Congress?
Moving from the baseline of Democrat leaders not taking a position on a mission
abroad to them opposing or to them supporting it changes the probability that these
Democrats prefer it by -1 point (SE = 2.3) and +1 point (SE = 2.2), respectively,
but not significantly. And moving from the baseline of Republican leaders not tak-
ing a position to them opposing it or supporting it changes support by +2 points
(SE = 2.3) and +6 points (SE = 2.4), respectively—the second of these impacts is
statistically significant but he first isn’t. This means that Democrats don’t change
their position on a mission abroad when they see the one Democrat leaders take—but
elite cute theory predicts that they take the same position. And Democrats take the
same position as Republican leaders when they see it—but elite cue theory predicts
the opposite of this: that they take the opposite position not the same.
These results suggest that elite cue theory incorrectly predicts the impacts of
cues from domestic partisan elites on the public most of the time. In one case—
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Figure 1.10. Causal impacts of position-taking by Republican leaders. This figure plots
the causal impact (point estimate of AMCE) of position-taking by Republican leaders in Congress on
the probability that an average respondent prefers a mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline
is no position. The “triangle” point estimates correspond to a Republican subject’s response and
the “square” point estimates correspond to a Democrat subject’s response to these cues.
Republican elites cueing Republicans—the theory predicts what happens here. In
another other case—Republican elites cueing Democrats—the theory predicts the
opposite of what happens here. And in the other two cases—Republican elites cueing
Democrats and Democrat elites cueing Democrats—the theory predicts something
happens but nothing actually happens here.
Why might elite cues have relatively minor impacts on respondents’ support for a
mission abroad—compared to what the elite-driven hypothesis predicts? One possi-
bility is that the conjoint experiment’s choice task might lower or even eliminate the
special status of elite cues as a heuristic, or shortcut. Recall that people use elite cues
to choose their “correct” level of war support while putting as little effort as possible
into gathering and cognitively processing information—maintaining accuracy benefit
while minimizing information costs. But the conjoint experiment’s choice task di-
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Figure 1.11. Causal impacts of position-taking by Democratic leaders. This figure plots
the causal impact (point estimate of AMCE) of position-taking by Democratic leaders in Congress on
the probability that an average respondent prefers a mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline
is no position. The “triangle” point estimates correspond to a Republican subject’s response and
the “square” point estimates correspond to a Democrat subject’s response to these cues.
rectly gives respondents information besides elite cues—reducing the effort required
to gather and cognitively process it and the attendant information costs to perhaps
near zero. Here in the artificial context of the conjoint experiment’s choice task—
unlike in the real world—respondents can gather and cognitively process information
besides elite cues to gain additional accuracy benefit without incurring additional
information costs—and doing so is rational. Here elite cues have to actually compete
with other types of information without their usual information cost advantage—and
greatly diminishing their influence on the public’s support for a mission abroad.
Now take the international elites here in Figure 1.12. How do Republicans respond
to position-taking by the United Nations Security Council? Moving from the baseline
of the Security Council not taking a position on a mission abroad to opposing or
supporting it reduces the probability that these Republicans prefer it by 1 point
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(SE = 2.9) and 2 points (SE = 2.8), respectively, but not significantly. And how do
Democrats respond? Moving the baseline of the Security Council not taking a position
to opposing or supporting it changes support by -1 point (SE = 2.4) and +6 points
(SE = 2.4), respectively—the second of these impacts is statistically significant but
he first isn’t. This means that Republicans don’t change their position on a mission
abroad when they see the one the Security Council takes—as elite cue theory predicts.
And Democrats take the same position as the Security Council does when they see it
supports a mission—again as elite cue theory predicts. But Democrats don’t change
their position when they see the Security Council opposes the mission—contra elite
cue theory’s prediction.
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Figure 1.12. Causal impacts of position-taking by the UN. This figure plots the causal
impact (point estimate of AMCE) of position-taking by the United Nations Security Council on the
probability that an average respondent prefers a mission. 90% confidence bands and the baseline is
no position. The “triangle” point estimates correspond to a Republican subject’s response and the
“square” point estimates correspond to a Democrat subject’s response to these cues.
These results suggests that elite cue theory correctly predicts the impacts of cues
from international elites on the public most of the time. In one case—international
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elites cueing Republicans—the theory predicts what happens here: nothing. In the
other case—international elites cueing Democrats—the theory is half right. The
theory predicts what actually happens from an international organization’s support
cue—but predicts something happens from the international organization’s oppose
cue when nothing actually happens here.
1.8 Discussion & Conclusion
This paper used a new approach developed in Hainmueller et al. (2014)—the conjoint
experiment—to simultaneously estimate the causal impacts—the average marginal
component effects (AMCEs)—of sixty different features of missions abroad. The
estimates of these causal impacts and AMCEs together comprise the use of force
literature’s first rough outline of the equation of the public’s calculus on war. Some
features of a mission affect support for it more than others when the public considers—
like here—many different dimensions at the same time all contextualizing each other—
with a relatively larger information set. A first way forward for future research is
seeing what happens with fewer dimensions and less contextualizing—with a relatively
smaller information set. In closing I point out three takeaways from the research in
this paper.
First, there’s more evidence here for the event-response hypothesis than for the
elite-driven hypothesis. In fact the causal impacts of events dominate those of elites.
The causal impacts of number of American casualties, cost in dollars, and chance of
success are the largest in this study and move support by up to 41 points, 23 points,
and 20 points, respectively. And the causal impacts of primary policy objective and
duration are the second largest and move support by up to 9 points and 8 points,
respectively. And the number of enemy casualties and the theater of war don’t do
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anything at all to support. But contrast these events with elites. The causal impacts
of Republican leaders in Congress and the United Nations Security Council move
support by up to 6 points while Democrat leaders don’t do anything at all. In terms
of magnitude the casual impact of American casualties almost septuples, cost in dollars
almost quadruples, and chance of success almost triples the potential causal impact
of elites on support. And not only that: the causal impacts for domestic elites aren’t
even in the directions predicted by the elite-driven hypothesis. Does the public care
what domestic or international elites think about a mission abroad once events on
the ground start? Clearly not in the more artificial setting of the conjoint experiment
in this paper—although perhaps the public does in the real world.
Second, there’s more evidence here for the casualties hypothesis—and its reformu-
lation as a component of the costs-benefits hypothesis—than any other hypothesis.
In fact the causal impact of American casualties dominates all others and in just the
way the casualties hypothesis predicts. The causal impact ranges from a 5-point re-
duction in support from just 100 American casualties to an unmatched 41-point one
from 1,000,000 and everything in between—the reduction in support monotonically
increases in the number of casualties. And a realistic 1,000 or 10,000 American casu-
alties reduces support by 16 or 20 points respectively—only an unrealistic $10 trillion
in dollar cost or a 90% chance of success changes support by more. This all suggests
that the public perceives that American casualties are a cost and that this cost is
the most important part of any costs-benefits calculus on war—just like decades of
scholarship on the use of force has also found.
Third—and finally—there’s evidence here for a hypothesis that the scholarship
on the use of force has ignored for decades: the “dollar cost hypothesis”—another
component of the costs-benefits hypothesis. In fact the causal impacts of dollar cost
are some of the largest in this study—in the same range as the causal impacts of
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American casualties and chance of success. The causal impact of dollar cost ranges
from a 7-point reduction in support from $10 billion cost to a 23-point one from $10
trillion cost and everything in between—the reduction in support is monotonically
increases in dollar cost. And a realistic $100 billion cost or $1 trillion cost reduces
support by around 13 or 14 points—only an unrealistic 100,000 and 1,000,000 Amer-
ican casualties or 75% and 90% chances of success change support by more. The
patterns of causal impacts for both dollar cost and American casualties are similar
because the public perceives both as costs in their costs-benefits calculus on war—
with dollar cost as an important part but not as important as American casualties.
Future research should study this dollar cost hypothesis further. The potential causal
impacts of dollar cost on support for a mission abroad are nearly as large as those for
American casualties and the chance of success—and yet we know so much about the
last two and almost nothing about the first at the time of this writing.
40
Essay 2
The Elasticity of War Casualty Impacts:
Evidence from a Panel Experiment
2.1 Introduction
The practice of reporting the enemy body count dates back to at least the Pelopon-
nesian War (Phillips, 2009). During the Vietnam War, the military of the United
States released daily enemy body counts at press briefings in Saigon called “five
o’clock follies” (Gartner and Myers, 1995; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006). During the
War in Afghanistan and the War in Iraq, the military initially abandoned this prac-
tice. In 2002, Commander of United States Central Command (CENTCOM) General
Tommy Franks stated “we don’t do body counts,” echoing the military’s official pol-
icy at the time. But eventually, the United States military reversed its official policy,
reverting back to this practice from Vietnam and antiquity—if temporarily (Phillips,
2009; Kaplan, 2011). Why? One possible answer is that the military reported the
enemy body count during the War in Afghanistan and the War in Iraq as a strategy
to make the public evaluate those engagements more highly than it would otherwise.
The United States military must continuously report the number of casualties it
sustains during a war for political reasons. The public uses the American body count
to evaluate the war: the greater the American body count, the lower the public’s
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evaluation of the war (Mueller, 1971, 1973; Lorell et al., 1985; Larson, 1996; Gartner
et al., 1997; Gartner and Segura, 1998; Burk, 1999; Klarevas, 2000; Gartner, 2008;
Gelpi et al., 2009). But a problem emerges here: the military decreases the public’s
evaluation of the war by continuously reporting the increasing American body count
but must report it. A solution to this problem would raise the public’s evaluation
of the war, countervailing the negative effect from the military’s mandatory and
continuous reporting of the increasing American body count. Boettcher and Cobb
(2006) suggests an approach. According to the authors, the public uses the enemy
body count to evaluate the war: all else equal, the greater the enemy body count given
some American body count, the higher the public’s evaluation of the war. A possible
solution emerges here then: the military might increase the public’s evaluation of
the war by continuously reporting the increasing enemy body count in addition to
continuously reporting the increasing American body count.
I demonstrate two main empirical results in this paper. First, no study to date
shows that either this problem exists nor that this solution fixes it using the exper-
imental method, the gold standard in causal inference (for a review, see Druckman
et al., 2010), but I do so here. Second, I also show in this paper that both this
problem and the effectiveness of this solution not only both exist and but also both
fade out of existence—vanishing over time during a war. I use an innovative survey
experiment which allows me to infer causality, in contradistinction to most previous
works which use observational data and can only detect correlations which suggest
causality.1
1First, Many studies demonstrate observationally that the problem exists (i.e., the military de-
creases the public’s evaluation of the war by continuously reporting the increasing American body
count)(Mueller, 1971, 1973; Lorell et al., 1985; Larson, 1996; Gartner et al., 1997; Gartner and Segura,
1998; Burk, 1999; Klarevas, 2000; Gartner, 2008; Gelpi et al., 2009). However, no study demonstrates
experimentally that the problem exists, although just one extant study,Gartner (2008), suggests that
it does. In particular, Gartner (2008) demonstrates experimentally two results. First, at any moment
when the military reports the increasing American body count, the public’s evaluation of the war
42
First, consider the existence and vanishing of the problem. Many studies show
experimentally that the public’s evaluation of a war decreases at any moment when
the military reports the increasing American body count at that moment, but no
studies show experimentally that the public’s evaluation of the war decreases over
time as the military continuously reports the American body count over time, the
problem at hand. In this paper, I present experimental evidence not only that the
problem exists, but that it vanishes over the duration of the war. In particular, I
show experimentally that the public’s evaluation of the war decreases over time as
the military continuously reports the increasing American body count over time but
that the rate of decrease decelerates to zero over time. Second, consider the existence
and vanishing of the solution. Boettcher and Cobb (2006) suggests (but does not
show either observationally or experimentally) that the public’s evaluation of the war
increases at any moment when the military reports the increasing enemy body count
in addition to the increasing American body count at that moment, but no studies
show experimentally that the public’s evaluation of the war increases over time as
the military continuously reports the increasing enemy body count in addition to
the increasing American body count over time, a possible solution to the problem
at hand. In this paper, I present experimental evidence not only that this solution
fixes the problem, but that it vanishes over the duration of a war. In particular, I
decreases at that moment. Second, this first result is greater when the American body count is ac-
celerating but lesser when the American body count is decelerating. Unfortunately, while these two
results from Gartner (2008) suggest that the problem exists, they do not demonstrate experimen-
tally that it in fact does. Second, no studies demonstrate either observationally or experimentally
that the solution fixes the problem (i.e., the military increases the public’s evaluation of the war
by continuously reporting the increasing enemy body count in addition to continuously reporting
the increasing American body count), although Gartner and Myers (1995) and Boettcher and Cobb
(2006) suggest that it does. In particular for the latter, Boettcher and Cobb (2006) demonstrates
one result: at any moment when the military reports the increasing enemy body count in addition
to reporting the American body count for a recent battle during in the war, the public’s evaluation
of the war as a whole increases at that moment. Unfortunately, while this result from Boettcher and
Cobb (2006) suggests that the solution fixes the problem, it does not demonstrate observationally
or experimentally that it indeed does.
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show experimentally that the public’s evaluation of the war increases over time as
the military continuously reports the increasing enemy body count along with the
increasing American body count over time but that the rate of increase decelerates
to zero over time. This paper mostly concerns itself exclusively with public opinion
dynamics rather than statics—what happens over time rather than what happens at
some moment.
In the remainder of this paper, I present these empirical results and develop a
theory that explains them. In particular, I extend the theory of the “elasticity of
reality” from Baum and Groeling (2010) and formalize one of its possible underlying
mechanisms—and use both to explain my two main empirical results. The elastic-
ity of reality refers to a phenomenon during war where “early in a conflict, typical
individuals have limited information [...] [c]onsequently, new information should be
relatively influential. Over time, as they acquire new information and their opinions
solidify, the influence of additional new information is likely to recede” (Baum and
Groeling, 2010, p. 446). The military’s mandatory reporting of the American body
count and the enemy body count are such “additional new information” and so their
influences on the public’s evaluation of the war recede over time—until perhaps their
influence is zero—so that the military’s problem and the candidate solution that I
describe here not only exist but also fade out of existence and vanish over the course
of a war. So my empirical results in this paper also provide the first support for
the theory of elasticity of reality based on experimental data—overcoming many of
the problems that Baum and Groeling (2010) suggests occur with the observational
data in that study: “testing dynamic patterns in public opinion poses a variety of
substantive and methodological challenges. Many factors vary over time, and it is
difficult, if not impossible, to account for all potential causal variables” (Baum and
Groeling, 2010, p. 446).
44
2.2 The Event-Response Mechanism
In this section, I develop a theory of how an individual’s evaluation of a war changes
at any moment and over time in response to events. I emphasize here that it only
considers one mechanism—events—and ignores all others—namely, political elites
(for the latter, see Belknap and Campbell, 1951; Zaller, 1992; Larson, 1996; Berinsky,
2007, 2009; Baum and Groeling, 2009b). This is intentional, and for two reasons.
First, it allows me clearly explicate the event-response mechanism without distraction
from other mechanisms. Second, I test the event-response mechanism in isolation from
all other mechanism in my experiment. Future research should consider an integration
of all the possible mechanisms present in reality, especially the combination of the
event-response mechanism and the elite-driven mechanism.
2.2.1 The Event-Response Mechanism
The event-response literature argues that a citizen’s evaluation of a war changes in
response to the occurrence of events over the duration of the war (inter alia, Mueller,
1971, 1973; Lorell et al., 1985; Jentleson, 1992; Larson, 1996; Gartner et al., 1997;
Gartner and Segura, 1998; jen; Burk, 1999; Klarevas, 2000; Eichenberg, 2003; Feaver
and Gelpi, 2004; Eichenberg, 2005; Gelpi et al., 2006; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006;
Fordham, 2008; Gartner, 2008; Gelpi et al., 2009). The claim of the event-response
literature consists of three components and assumes that a citizen is rational (see
Downs, 1957). First, a citizen gains benefits b(t) from positive events and incurs
costs c(t) from the negative events that occur at moment t during the war. Second,
the citizen’s utility u(t) at moment t during the war equals the sum B(t) of the
benefits that he gains from positive events minus the sum C(t) of the costs he incurs
from the negative events that occured from the beginning at moment 0 up to moment
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t. By definition, B(t) =
∑t
0 b(t)dt and C(t) =
∑t
0 c(t)dt in discrete time. Third, the
citizen’s evaluation v(t) of the war at moment t equals his utility u(t) at moment t,
or v(t) = u(t), which means that his utility and evaluation of the war are equivalent.
These three components of the event-response mechanism together imply that
v(t) = u(t) = B(t)− C(t) =
t∑
0
b(t)−
t∑
0
c(t)
Now consider how the event-response mechanism works. Increasing positive events
occur over time during the war, and this implies that the citizen gains an increasing
sum of benefits from them over time, or B(t) > B(t− 1) at any moment t. Similarly,
increasing negative events occur over time during the war, and this implies that the
citizen incurs an increasing sum of costs from them over time, or C(t) > C(t − 1)
at any moment t. If during the war the increasing sum of benefits that the citizen
gains from positive events exceeds the increasing sum of costs that he incurs from
negative events, then his utility and evaluation of the war increase over time. But if
during the war the increasing sum of costs that the citizen incurs from negative events
exceeds increasing sum of benefits that he gains from positive events, then his utility
and evaluation of the war decrease over time. And if during the war the increasing
sum of costs that the citizen incurs from negative events equals the increasing sum of
benefits that he gains from positive events, then his utility and evaluation of the war
do not change over time.
2.2.2 An Application
Now consider a particular instance of the event-response mechanism at work. The
event-response literature identifies several possible negative and positive events that
occur during a war—consider in turn an example of each. First, this literature argues
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that a citizen incurs costs from the killings of American soldiers during the war, and
they are thus negative events (Mueller, 1971, 1973; Lorell et al., 1985; Larson, 1996;
Gartner et al., 1997; Gartner and Segura, 1998; Burk, 1999; Klarevas, 2000; Gartner,
2008). Since the killings of American soldiers increase during the war, the citizen
incurs an increasing sum of costs from them, and all else equal (i.e., no other events
occur) his utility and evaluation of the war decrease over time. This is the problem
at hand, and it is my first hypothesis, stated formally below.
Hypothesis 1 (Problem Existence). As the American body count increases from
moment 0 to moment t during a war (i.e., as C(t) increases), all else equal (i.e.,
no other events occur) a citizen’s evaluation of the war decreases from moment 0 to
moment t (i.e., v(t) decreases).
Second, this literature argues that a citizen gains benefits from the killings of
enemy soldiers during the war, and they are thus positive events (Gartner and Myers,
1995; Boettcher and Cobb, 2006). Since the killings of enemy soldiers increase during
the war, the citizen gains an increasing sum of benefits from them, and all else equal
(i.e., no other events occur) his utility and evaluation of the war increase over time.
This is a possible solution to the problem, and it is my second hypothesis, stated
formally below.
Hypothesis 2 (Solution Existence). As the enemy body count increases from moment
0 to moment t during a war (i.e., as B(t) increases), all else equal (i.e., no other
events occur) a citizen’s evaluation of the war increases from moment 0 to moment t
(i.e., v(t) increases).
Third, since the killings of Americans soldiers increase at the same time the killings
of enemy soldiers do, the citizen incurs an increasing sum of costs from the former
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and an increasing sum of benefits from the latter over time. During the war, if the
increasing sum of costs that the citizen incurs from the killings of American soldiers
exceeds the increasing sum of benefits that he gains from the killings of enemy soldiers,
then all else equal (i.e., no other events occur) his utility and evaluation of the war
decrease over time. Here this solution fixes the problem only partially. But during
the war, if the increasing sum of benefits that the citizen gains from the killings of
enemy soldiers exceeds the increasing sum of costs that he incurs from the killings
of American soldiers, then all else equal (i.e., no other events occur) his utility and
evaluation of the war increase over time. Here the solution completely fixes the
problem. And during the war, if the increasing sum of costs that the citizen incurs
from the killings of American soldiers equals the increasing sum of benefits that he
gains from the killings of enemy soldiers, then all else equal (i.e., no other events
occur) his evaluation of the war does not change over time. Here the solution fixes
the problem completely, too. These latter two statements form my third hypothesis,
stated formally below.
Hypothesis 3 (Solution Effective). As the American body count increases and the
enemy body count increases from moment 0 to moment t during a war (i.e., as C(t)
and B(t) increase) and the increasing sum of benefits from the latter exceeds the
increasing sum of costs from the former (i.e., B(t) ≥ C(t)), all else equal (i.e., no
other events occur) a citizen’s evaluation of the war is non-decreasing from moment
0 to moment t (i.e., v(t) increases or does not change).
2.2.3 Completing the Event-Response Mechanism
I contend that the event-response mechanism as described in the previous section is
incomplete. I argue that independent of the relative magnitudes of the increasing
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sum of benefits a citizen gains from increasing positive events and the increasing
sum of costs he incurs from negative events over time, after some moment during a
war his utility and evaluation of the war no longer changes. This implies that the
citizen’s utility and evaluation of the war converge to some value at some moment,
after which he no longer responds to the occurrence of new events. Is this argument
and its implication reasonable?
The argument I make here is nearly parallel to the one Baum and Groeling (2010)
make with the concept of “the elasticity of reality” (p. 445; also see Baum and Potter,
2008). According to Baum and Groeling (2010), “as the public gathers more informa-
tion over time, the potential gap between reality and its representation [...] will likely
recede, as will the public’s responsiveness to additional information [...] we refer to
this relative change in responsiveness as the ‘elasticity of reality’ ” (p. 445). During
a war, as the public gathers more information over time about positive and negative
events that occur, the public’s response to additional information recedes. That is,
the public gains diminishing benefit from positive events and incurs diminishing costs
from negative events until its utility and evaluation of the war no longer change and
in fact converge to fixed values. But what is the underlying mechanism that causes
this elasticity of reality during a war?
Recall from the previous section that the event-response literature claims that a
citizen gains benefits b(t) from positive events and incurs costs c(t) from negative
events that occur at some moment t during a war. But the event-response literature
does not specify the mechanism that determines the magnitudes |b(t)| and |c(t)| of
these benefits and costs at moment t, respectively, in a rigorous way. By definition,
the mechanism that determines these magnitudes would be the same as the one that
causes the elasticity of reality. One basis for this mechanism might be found in Lodge
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et al. (1995)—“the online model of information processing” or online (OL) model
(also see Lodge et al., 1989).
According to the OL model, as people receive a piece of information about some-
thing, first they immediately extract the “affective value” either positive or negative
of that received information and add it to their running evaluation of an object—
also called their “affective integrator” or online (OL) tally (Lodge et al., 1995, p.
310). And second, they then forget that received information stored in short-term
memory but remember their online tally—with their evaluations of that object now
updated—stored in long-term memory. The OL model implies that although people
forget the received information, they still know their online tally of the object—so
that received information continues to impact their evaluations, albeit indirectly. For
example, a negative message about a political candidate running for election might
decrease people’s running evaluations of him and then eventually be forgotten—but
they’ll still know their online tally that has been lowered by this information about
him (for an alternative explanation of information processing, see Zaller, 1992; Zaller
and Feldman, 1992).
I describe here a simplified and stylized mechanism based on this online (OL)
model of information processing—but with some departure from it. First, a citizen
knows information set I(t) at moment t that contains indicators for negative and
positive events that have occurred up to moment t during a war. In particular, the
elements of I(t) are 1 or −1 where a 1 indicates a positive event and a −1 indicates a
negative that has occurred up to moment t during a war. I emphasize here that while
the citizen knows indicators for negative and positive events up to a particular time,
this doesn’t mean that he remembers anything about these events themselves—he
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only tallies the benefits gained and costs incurred from them.2 For example, I(3) =
{1,−1, 1, 1} means that three positive events and one negative event have occurred
up to moment t = 3 during a war. Second, he calculates his benefits gained B(I(t))
and costs incurred C(I(t)) from the positive events and negative events, respectively,
in this information set I(t)—and the difference between these two quantities equals
his utility u(I(t)) at moment t. In particular, he calculates his benefits at time t
as the average of the indicators for positive events—and since all of them take the
value 1 their average is also 1—weighted by the proportion in the information set
I(t), and he also calculates his costs at time t as the average of the absolute value
of the indicators for negative events—and since all of them take the value −1 this
average is also 1—weighted by the proportion of them in the information set I(t).
Continuing the example, B(I(3)) = 0.75 and C(I(3)) = 0.25 so u(I(3)) = 0.5. Third,
his evaluation v(t) of the war at moment t equals his utility u(I(t)) at moment t,
or v(t) = u(I(t)). In particular, his evaluation is a function of his utility, and his
utility is a function of his information set, so his evaluation is also a function of his
information set, or v(I(t)) = v(t). Continuing the example, v(I(3)) = u(I(3)) = 0.5.
These components of the mechanism together imply that
v(I(t)) = u(I(t)) = B(I(t))− C(I(t)) =
t∑
0
b(t)−
t∑
0
c(t)
This equation differs from the one that the event-response mechanism implies because
the former specifies a citizen’s evaluation of a war as a function of his information set
I(t) at moment t while the latter specifies his evaluation as a function of time t itself.
Now consider how this mechanism actually works in practice. Recall that in ex-
tended example, the citizen knows information set I(3) = {1,−1, 1, 1} and calculates
2I use the term information set here because it parallels a similar concept from game theory (see
Mas-Colell et al., 1995).
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his benefits B(I(3)) = 0.75 and costs C(I(3)) = 0.5 and thus his utility and evalua-
tion of the war as v(I(3)) = u(I(3)) = 0.5. What happens when a single new positive
event occurs here? Say this single new positive event occurs by moment t = 4 during
the war. First, now the citizen knows information set I(4) = {1,−1, 1, 1, 1} so that
four positive events and one negative event have occurred up to moment t = 4. Sec-
ond, now the citizen calculates his benefits B(I(4)) = 0.8 equal to the average of the
indicators for positive events weighted by the proportion of them in information set
I(4). And now he calculates his costs C(I(4)) = 0.2 equal to the average of the indi-
cators for negative events weighted by the proportion of them in information set I(4).
Third, now he calculates his utility and evaluation of the war v(I(4)) = u(I(4)) = 0.6
equal to his benefits B(I(4)) less his costs C(I(4)). So this new positive event from
moment t = 3 to moment t = 4 during the war causes his evaluation to increase by
0.1 from v(I(3)) = 0.5 to v(I(4)) = 0.6.
But what happens when yet another single new positive event occurs? Say
this single new positive event occurs by moment t = 5 during the war. Following
the same steps as the previous paragraph, now he knows information set I(5) =
{1,−1, 1, 1, 1, 1}, he calculates his benefits B(I(5)) = 0.67 and costs C(I(5)) = 0.17,
and his utility and evaluation of the war are v(I(5)) = u(I(5)) = 0.67. So this new
positive event from moment t = 4 to moment t = 5 during the war causes his evalua-
tion to increase by 0.07 from v(I(4)) = 0.6 to v(I(5)) = 0.67. But recall that before
this a new positive event from moment t = 3 to moment t = 4 causes his evaluation to
increase by 0.1 from v(I(3)) = 0.5 to v(I(4)) = 0.6. Here, a positive event occurring
at an earlier moment during a war—when fewer event have already occurred—has
a greater impact on a citizen’s evaluation than a positive event occurring at a later
moment—when more events have already occurred. An analogous argument applies
to negative events.
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What is going on here? As a citizen’s information set contains more indicators for
events that occur during a war, he averages over more of them in calculating his costs
and benefits and ultimately his utility and evaluation. Mathematically, this means
that the impacts of new events on his costs and benefits must eventually diminish to
zero—and this means that his utility and evaluation of the war eventually converge to
some fixed value and never change again. Below I prove this claim for the simplified
and stylized version of the mechanism presented here—although the claim and its
intuition are certainly robust to other versions.
Lemma 1. For x, y > 0,
x+ 1
y + 1
− x
y
>
x+ 2
y + 2
− x+ 1
y + 1
Proof. Note that x+1
y+1
−x
y
= y−x
y2+y
and x+2
y+2
−x+1
y+1
= y−x
y2+3y+2
. But since y2+3y+2 > y2+y,
then y−x
y2+y
> y−x
y2+3y+2
and the conclusion follows.
Proposition 1 (Convergence from the Elasticity of Reality). If the mechanism as
described above holds, then a citizen’s evaluation v(I(t)) of a war converges to some
fixed value over time, or v(I(t))→ v∗.
Proof. Let IB(t) ⊂ I(t) be the set of all indicators for positive events in information
set I(t). Thus by definition B(I(t)) = |IB(t)||I(t)| . Now choose t, t − 1, t − 2 such that
|IB(t)| = |IB(t − 1)| + 1 and |IB(t − 1)| = |IB(t − 2)| + 1. Note that b(t − 1) =
B(I(t − 1)) − B(I(t − 2)) = |IB(t−1)||I(t−1)| − |IB(t−2)||I(t−2)| = |IB(t−2)|+1|I(t−2)|+1 − |IB(t−2)||I(t−2)| and that
b(t) = B(I(t)) − B(I(t − 1)) = |IB(t)||I(t)| − |IB(t−1)||I(t−1)| = |IB(t−2)|+2|I(t−2)|+2 − |IB(t−2)|+1|I(t−2)|+1 . Thus
by Lemma 1 b(t) < b(t−1) for all t and a similar argument shows that c(t) < c(t−1)
for all t. Thus b(t) → 0 and c(t) → 0. Thus B(t) → B∗ and C(t) → C∗. Thus
v(t)→ B∗ − C∗ = v∗.
53
The logic of the preceding explanation implies two things. First, while the citizen
gains an increasing sum of benefits and incurs and increasing sum of costs from
increasing positive and negative events during the war, or B(t) > B(t − 1) and
C(t) > C(t− 1), respectively, he does so at a decreasing rate, or b(t) < b(t− 1) and
c(t) < c(t− 1) at any moment t, respectively, because of the elasticity of reality. And
second, after some moment during the war, this process does not happen at all, or
b(t)→ 0 and c(t)→ 0, because of the elasticity of reality. These two things together
imply that the sum of the benefits that the citizen gains from positive events and the
sum of the costs that he incurs from negative events no longer changes after some
moment, both converging to some values, or B(t) → B∗ and C(t) → C∗. And this
further implies that the citizen’s evaluation of the war no longer changes after this
moment, converging to some value, or v(t)→ B∗ − C∗ = v∗. Under the logic of this
section then, my argument makes sense, completing the event-response mechanism.
This completed event-response mechanism suggests that the effect of events on the
individual’s evaluation of the war is greatest at its onset and declines over its duration
until they have none at all because of the elasticity of reality. And this suggests that
the citizen’s evaluation of the war converges to some value at some moment during
the war and no longer changes afterward. While the first suggestion is valid in any
context, I emphasize again here that this second suggestion is valid when the event-
response mechanism is the only one in motion—and in reality this is not the case,
although it certainly is in the context of my experiment. In particular, the elite-driven
mechanism would predict that political elites like Congress and the President affect
the individual’s evaluation of the war simultaneously with events—and the former
would continue to do so after the effectiveness of the latter fades.
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2.2.4 A Reapplication
Now consider the previous particular instance of the complete event-response mech-
anism at work. First, recall that since the killings of American soldiers are negative
events, as they increase, a citizen incurs an increasing sum of costs from them, and
all else equal (i.e., no other events occur) a citizen’s utility and evaluation of the war
decrease over time. But by the logic of the previous section and because of the elas-
ticity of reality, this process happens at a decreasing rate.3 This means the problem
at hand vanishes over time, and it is my fourth hypothesis, stated formally below.
Hypothesis 4 (Vanishing Problem). As the American body count increases from
moment 0 to moment t during a war (i.e., as C(t)), all else equal (i.e., no other
events occur) a citizen’s evaluation of the war decreases at a decreasing rate from
moment 0 to moment t (i.e., v(t) decreases at a decreasing rate).
Second, recall that since the killings of enemy soldiers are positive events, as they
increase, the citizen incurs an increasing sum of benefits from them, and all else equal
(i.e., no other events occur) a citizen’s utility and evaluation of the war increase over
time. But by the logic of the previous section and because of the elasticity of reality,
this process happens at a decreasing rate. This means the solution vanishes over time,
and it is my fifth hypothesis, stated formally below.
Hypothesis 5 (Vanishing Solution). As the enemy body count increases from moment
0 to moment t during a war (i.e., as B(t) increases), all else equal (i.e., no other
events occur) a citizen’s evaluation of the war increases at a decreasing rate from
moment 0 to moment t (i.e., v(t) increases at a decreasing rate).
3This is similar to the prediction of Mueller (1971) that the public’s support is inversely related
to the logarithm of cumulative casualties over time.
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Third, since by the logic of the previous section and because of the elasticity of
reality after some moment during the war, these two processes do not happen at all
after this moment and a citizen’s utility and evaluation do not change for the war’s
remainder. This means not only that the problem and its solution fully vanish, but
that the citizen’s evaluation of the war converges to some value at some moment and
does not change afterward. This is my sixth hypothesis, stated formally below.
Hypothesis 6 (Convergence). A citizen’s evaluation of a war converges to some
value at some moment t∗ (i.e., v(t) converges to v∗ = B∗−C∗) and remains fixed for
the remainder of the war.
2.3 A Panel Experiment
I obtain data useful for testing these six hypotheses through a so-called panel experi-
ment, a research design first coined and developed in Gartner (2008). I used Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk to recruit a nonprobability sample of 420 subjects to complete “a
23-question opinion survey on U.S. military action abroad” and used Qualtrics to
collect their responses from June 26, 2012 through July 3, 2012. I obtained 348 re-
sponses in total because I eliminated the responses of subjects that failed to pass an
instructional manipulation check. This restriction does not significantly change the
results in this study.4 Recent research argues that the results of survey experiments
4In the panel experiment the instructional manipulation check consisted of a statement a ques-
tion that all subjects received. The statement was: “Recent research on decision making shows
that choices are affected by context. Differences in how people feel, their previous knowledge and
experience, and their environment can affect choices. To help us understand how people make de-
cisions, we are interested in information about you. Specifically, we are interested in whether you
actually take the time to read the directions; if not, some results may not tell us very much about
decision making in the real world. To show that you have read the instructions, please ignore the
question on the next slide and instead choose only the “successful” option as your answer. ” The
question following was: “Some people believe that the U.S. has been successful in its operations in
Afghanistan, while others believe we have not been so successful. How do you feel about the progress
the U.S. has made in Afghanistan?” The question had five possible responses: “very unsuccessful,”
“unsuccessful,” “evenly mixed,” “successful,” and “very successful.”
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with subject samples collected via Mechanical Turk are both internally and externally
valid for answering research questions emerging in political science (Berinsky et al.,
2012) as well as in economics and psychology (Buhrmester et al., 2011; Horton et al.,
2011). Particularly with respect to generalizability, Berinsky et al. (2012) shows that
samples recruited via Mechanical Turk are more representative than undergraduate
convenience samples but only slightly less representative than internet and national
probability samples (also see Ipeirotis, 2010; Ross et al., 2010; Paolacci et al., 2010).
I paid $0.10 to each subject upon completion of the panel experiment. Buhrmester
et al. (2011) shows that the payment amount does not affect the quality of subjects’
responses (also see Mason and Watts, 2009; Chen and Horton, 2010; Horton and
Chilton, 2010).
A panel experiment randomly assigns subjects to two or more control and treat-
ment groups which receive different treatments and then complete the same post-
treatment measures just like a typical experiment. However, a panel experiment
differs from a typical experiment in the way subjects receive treatment and complete
the measures. In a panel experiment, subjects receive a treatment consisting of a
sequence of survey panels which contain content and complete the same measures on
or after each survey panel in the sequence. But in a typical experiment—subjects re-
ceive a treatment on a single survey panel which contains content and then complete
the same measures on or after this one survey panel. Both a panel experiment and
a typical experiment takes place in a single setting and subjects are not recontacted
again. Again, Gartner (2008) coins the term “panel experiment” in contradistinction
to a typical experiment, so I continue to use it here and note that a panel experiment
does indeed produce panel data: it observes the same respondents with the same
measures at different points in time—although in a single setting in which time is
marked by sequential panels instead of sequential recontacts.
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Consider the panel experiments in Gartner (2008) as an example. First, subjects
in each treatment group receive a sequence of ten survey panels that each report
the American body count for a particular month and the cumulative American body
count up to that month inclusive in a ten-month hypothetical war. As Gartner (2008)
describes: “Subjects are presented with a hypothetical U.S. military scenario. [...]
Subjects then view newspaper-like reports (text and graph) of the resulting monthly
and cumulative U.S. casualties. [...] There are ten potential panels” (p. 100–101).
Second, at each survey panel (corresponding to a particular month), subjects answer a
question in which they “choose whether the United States should continue to employ
force” with the two possible responses of “yes” and “no” where “[a] ‘no’ answer leads
to exit questions and termination. A ‘yes’ answer leads to another casualty report and
opportunity to choose whether to support or oppose the operation” (p. 101). Third,
the monthly pattern of American body count accumulation varies across treatment
groups. Again, as Gartner (2008) describes: “the figures presented in the report
depend on the subject’s randomly assigned casualty group. Each group has a unique
[...] casualty pattern—that is, each group provides subjects with a different casualty
experience.” Altogether, this allows the author to infer the causal effect of a particular
monthly pattern of American body count accumulation on when a subject chooses to
end the hypothetical war in question.
In this study, I run a panel experiment that differs in format from the one in
Gartner (2008) in three ways. First, subjects in each treatment group receive a
sequence of ten survey panels corresponding to a ten-year hypothetical war that each
report either just the American body count for a particular year and the cumulative
American body count up to that year inclusive, just the enemy body count for a
particular year and the cumulative enemy body count up to that year inclusive, or
both the American and enemy body counts up to that year inclusive. This differs
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from Gartner (2008) in that subjects might receive the per period and cumulative
enemy body either alone or together with the per period and cumulative American
body count instead of just the per period and cumulative American body count
alone (and further panels correspond to a particular year of war instead of just a
particular month). Second, at each survey panel (corresponding to a particular year),
subjects answer a question in which they “grade the progress the U.S. has made
in the country so far” with eleven possible responses on an ordered scale from “F”
to “A+.” Again, this differs from Gartner (2008) in that subjects rate the war’s
progress on a continuous scale instead of indicating whether they want to continue
the war or not in a binary way (and further subjects see all ten survey panels instead
of exiting the survey based on their prior answers). Third, the yearly patterns of
American body count accumulation and enemy body count accumulations does not
vary across treatment groups. Instead, whether either or both of these yearly patterns
of American body count accumulation and enemy body count accumulation is received
or not varies across treatment groups. And again, this differs from Gartner (2008)
in that subjects see different types of body counts accumulations—American, enemy,
or both—in the same patterns instead of different patterns of the same type of body
count accumulations—just American. Altogether, this allows me to infer the causal
effect of the fixed yearly pattern of American body count accumulation, the fixed
yearly pattern of enemy body count accumulation, or both on how a subject grades the
progress the United States has made over time at any of the ten particular years in the
hypothetical war in question. Unlike Gartner (2008), my study does not investigate
the causal impact of treatments on when a subject chooses to end a war, but something
else: the subjects’ grading of the United States’ progress in the war at any of its ten
particular years. In sum, the panel experiments in this study and in Gartner (2008)
differ in terms of their treatments, measures, and causal impacts under investigation.
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It is also worth discussing how the “cross-sectional” experiment in Boettcher and
Cobb (2006) differs from the panel experiments in this study and in Gartner (2008).
First, in Boettcher and Cobb (2006), subjects in each treatment group receive a single
survey panel that reports just the American body count, just the enemy body count,
or both the American and enemy body counts for a particular hypothetical battle
during the War in Iraq. As the authors describe: “we created five mock New York
Times articles about a military operation in Iraq. Each article was identical, except
for a sentence describing American, insurgent, American and insurgent, or American
and terrorist dead” (p. 842). By contrast, panel experiments in Gartner (2008) and in
this study have multiple survey panels that report various per period and cumulative
body counts corresponding to various periods of time during an entire war. Second,
in Boettcher and Cobb (2006), at a single survey panel subjects answer a question
in which they indicate how “they feel about the progress the U.S. has made in Iraq
after the war ended” in its postwar operations with the five possible responses of “very
unsuccessful,” “somewhat unsuccessful,” “evenly mixed,” “somewhat successful”, and
“very successful” (p. 851). Again by contrast, the panel experiment in this study
has subjects answer a similar question but instead by giving a rating on an 11-point
continuous and ordered scale on multiple survey panels, while the panel experiment in
Gartner (2008) has subjects answer an entirely different question in a binary way on
multiple survey panels. Third, in Boettcher and Cobb (2006), whether either or both
American casualties and enemy casualties during a particular hypothetical battle
during the War in Iraq are reported varies across treatment groups. By contrast,
panel experiments in Gartner (2008) and in this study vary the patterns of the per
period and cumulative body counts over time during a war. Altogether, this allows
the authors to infer the causal effect of the American body count, the enemy body
count, or both body counts on how a subject grades the progress the United States
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has made since the end of the War in Iraq in its postwar operations in that country
at a particular point in time. So the experiments in this study, in Gartner (2008),
and in Boettcher and Cobb (2006) differ in terms of treatments, measures, and the
causal impacts under investigation—which I summarize in the table below.
Type Treatments Measure
This Study 10-panel American/enemy/both body counts Progress in war
Gartner (2008) 10-panel Different American body counts Continuing war
Boettcher & Cobb (2006) 1-panel American/enemy/both body counts Progress in war
Table 2.1. Differences across related studies. Two studies related to this one—Gartner (2008)
and Boettcher & Cobb (2006)—have experiments that differ from the one in this study in terms of
type of experiment, treatments, and measures, and altogether the causal effects under investigation.
Now consider how I implemented the panel experiment in the present study. Sub-
jects advanced through ten survey panels. On the introductory panel, all subjects
received the following statement about a hypothetical use of force based on the War
in Iraq and instructions: “It is now the year 2013, and U.S. armed forces invade a
country in the central Middle East. The following panels describe some events that
take place during this conflict. At each panel, please grade the progress that the U.S.
has made in this country up to that point using the slider, where A+ is the best grade
and F is the worst grade.” Each of the following nine survey panels corresponds to
exactly one of the nine years of the scenario from 2013 through 2021 in chronological
order. On each of these survey panels, all subjects received a statement about the
scenario’s events during the corresponding year along with the question: “How would
you grade the progress the U.S. has made in this country so far?” which all subjects
then answered with one of thirteen possible responses between “A+” and “F.”5 For
5On these panels, all subjects received the statements “in 2013, U.S. forces overwhelm and dis-
band the country’s army and remove its dictatorial regime,” “in 2014, insurgents begin an extended
campaign of killing, kidnapping, and beheading civilians and military personnel,” “in 2015, U.S.
forces install a democratic regime in the country,” “in 2016, U.S. forces kill the leader of the in-
surgents,” “in 2017, the U.S. deploys additional troops to the country in order to stabilize violence
around its capital city,” “in 2018, the U.S. hands over security responsibilities for one of the coun-
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example, on the fifth panel corresponding to the year 2017, all subjects received the
one additional statement: “In 2017, the U.S. sends additional troops to the country
in order to stabilize violence around its capital city.”
The panel experiment randomly assigned subjects to either a control group or one
of three treatment groups. Subjects in the control group received on each survey panel
only a statement about the scenario’s non-casualty events during the corresponding
year during the use of force. For example, on the fifth panel corresponding to the year
2017, subjects in the control group received the statement: “In 2017, the U.S. deploys
additional troops to the country in order to stabilize violence around its capital city.”
Subjects in the first treatment group additionally received on each survey panel the
cumulative American body count X at the corresponding year given by the statement:
“At this point, a total of X U.S. troops have been killed.”6 For example, on the fifth
panel corresponding to the year 2017, subjects in the first treatment group receive
the statement: “In 2017, the U.S. deploys additional troops to the country in order
to stabilize violence around its capital city. At this point, a total of 3,908 U.S. troops
have been killed.” Subjects in the second treatment group additionally received on
each panel the cumulative enemy body count Y at the corresponding year given by
the statement: “At this point, a total of Y enemy insurgents have been killed.”7 For
example, on the fifth panel corresponding to the year 2017, subjects in the second
treatment group received the statement: “In 2017, the U.S. deploys additional troops
to the country in order to stabilize violence around its capital city. At this point, a
total of 21,300 enemy insurgents have been killed.” Subjects in the third treatment
try’s most peaceful provinces to the country’s own military,” “in 2019, U.S. forces withdraw from
the country’s capital and other major cities,” “in 2020, the U.S. officially ends combat operations
in the country,” “in 2021, the last U.S. forces leave the country,” respectively.
6On these panels in chronological order, X takes on the values 486; 1,335; 2,181; 3,004; 3,908;
4,222; 4,371; 4,431; and 4,485; respectively.
7On these panels in chronological order, Y takes on the values 603; 7,404; 10,651; 14,553; 21,300;
23,328; 23,816; 24,492; and 24,943; respectively.
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group additionally received on each panel both the cumulative American body count
X and the cumulative enemy body count Y at the corresponding year given by the
statement: “At this point, a total of X U.S. troops have been killed, and a total of
Y enemy insurgents have been killed.” For example, on the fifth panel corresponding
to the year 2017, subjects in the third treatment group received the statement: “In
2017, the U.S. deploys additional troops to the country in order to stabilize violence
around its capital city. At this point, a total of 3,908 U.S. troops have been killed,
and a total of 21,300 enemy insurgents have been killed.”
Summarily, the panel experiment has a 2 × 2 fully crossed design. The first factor
is no exposure or exposure on each survey panel to the cumulative American body
count at the corresponding year, and the second factor is no exposure or exposure
on each survey panel to the cumulative enemy body count at the corresponding year.
These two factors result in a control condition and three treatment conditions: expo-
sure to neither cumulative body count, called “Neither Cumulative Body Count” or
“C”; exposure to only the cumulative American body count, called “American Cu-
mulative Body Count” or “T1”; exposure to only the cumulative enemy body count,
called “Enemy Cumulative Body Count” or “T2”; and exposure to both cumulative
body counts, called “Both Cumulative Body Counts” or “T3.”
No Exposure American C.B.C.
No Exposure Neither C.B.C. (C) Only American C.B.C. (T1)
Enemy C.B.C. Only Enemy C.B.C. (T2) Both C.B.C. (T3)
Table 2.2. The design of the panel experiment. The panel experiment has a 2 × 2 fully
crossed design. The first factor is no exposure or exposure on each survey panel to the cumulative
American body count at the corresponding year, and the second factor is no exposure or exposure
on each panel to the cumulative enemy body count at the corresponding year. These two factors
result in a control condition and three treatment conditions: no exposure to either cumulative body
count, called “Neither” or “C”; exposure to only the cumulative American body count, called “Only
American Cumulative Body Count” or “T1”; exposure to only the cumulative enemy body count,
called “Only Enemy Cumulative Body Count” or “T2”; and exposure to both cumulative body
counts, called “Both Cumulative Body Counts” or “T3.”
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2.4 Analysis
I test the hypotheses using data obtained from the panel experiment described in the
previous section.
2.4.1 Variable Coding
Control Variables
I code in a standard way four control variables that indicate a subject’s partisan
identification, sex, highest level of education attained, and political knowledge, given
by Sex, Education, and Knowledge, respectively.
Treatment Variables
I code three variables that indicate a subject’s treatment group assignment in the
panel experiment. First, if the survey instrument assigned the subject to the first
treatment group (T1), where he received on each panel the cumulative American
body count at the corresponding year, the variable American takes on the value 1
but 0 otherwise. Second, if the survey instrument assigned the subject to the second
treatment group (T2), where he received on each panel the cumulative enemy body
count at the corresponding year, the variable Enemy takes on the value 1 but 0
otherwise. Third, if the survey instrument assigned the subject to the to the third
treatment group (T3), where he received on each panel both the cumulative American
body count and the cumulative enemy body count at the corresponding year, the
variable Both takes on the value 1 but 0 otherwise. Under this coding, if the survey
instrument assigned the subject to the control group (C), American, Enemy, and
Both all take on the value 0.
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Dependent Variables
I code nine dependent variables. Each dependent variable Grade T corresponds to
exactly one panel’s question, where T is that panel’s corresponding year, of which
there are nine. For example, the dependent variable Grade 2017 corresponds to the
question on the fifth panel with corresponding year 2017. If a subject’s answer is
“A+” then Grade T takes on the value 13. If the subject’s answer is “A” then Grade
T takes on the value 12. This pattern continues, so that if the subject’s answer is
“F,” then Grade T takes on the value 1.
2.4.2 Estimation
I perform two methods of analysis on the data obtained from the panel experiment.
In the first method, I perform five sets of nine Welch unequal variances t-tests. The
first set tests the difference in the mean of Grade T between those subjects assigned
to the control group (C) and those assigned to the first treatment group (T1) for all
T . The second set tests the difference in the mean of Grade T between those subjects
assigned to the control group (C) and those assigned to the second treatment group
(T2) for all T . The third set tests the difference in the mean of Grade T for those
subjects assigned to the first treatment group (T1) and those assigned to the third
treatment group (T3) for all T . The fourth set tests the difference in the mean of
Grade T for those subjects assigned to the second treatment group (T2) and those
assigned to the third treatment group (T3). The fifth set tests the difference in
the mean of Grade T between those subjects assigned to the control group (C) and
those assigned to the third treatment group (T3). In the second method, I estimate
an ordinary least squares regression model for Grade T for all T . Both methods
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yield approximately identical results. Therefore, I only present the results of the first
method, which are the easier to understand for the general reader.
2.5 Results
In this section, I briefly present the results of the analysis described in the previous
section. First consider Figure 2.1b, which plots for each survey panel and corre-
sponding year the cumulative American body count (given by A) and the cumulative
enemy body count (given by E). Both the cumulative American body count and the
cumulative enemy body count continuously increase simultaneously over all of the
nine panels and corresponding years, analogous to the casualty pattern during the
War in Iraq. This result indicates that the necessary conditions for all six hypotheses
are met.
Now consider Figure 2.1a, which plots for each survey panel and corresponding
year the mean grade of subjects assigned to the control group (C) (given by C), those
assigned to the first treatment group (T1) who additionally received on each survey
panel the cumulative American body count at the corresponding year (given by A),
those assigned to the the second treatment group (T2) who additionally received on
each survey panel the cumulative enemy body count at the corresponding year (given
by E), and those assigned to the third treatment group (T3) who additional received
on each survey panel both body counts at the corresponding year (given by B).
Unfortunately, the result of the experiment for the second survey panel corre-
sponding to the year 2014 is particularly anomalous with subjects in the control
group (C) giving a lower mean grade than those in any of the treatment groups (T1,
T2, and T3). I present one possible explanation. The statement about the scenario’s
non-casualty events during the second year on this second survey panel is relatively
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negative: “In 2014, insurgents begin an extended campaign of killing, kidnapping, and
beheading civilians and military personnel.” In receiving only this statement about
strongly negative non-casualty events, subjects in the control group lack context and
a frame of reference that any information about negative or positive casualty events
provide and so their response is volatile and has no ballast. On the other hand, in
receiving this statement about strongly negative non-casualty events, subjects in any
of the treatment groups have context and a frame of reference that information about
negative and positive casualty events provide and so their response is stable and has
a ballast. This explanation is speculative but reasonable, and regardless of its merit,
the following results still emerge from inspection when disregarding first and second
survey panels corresponding to the years 2013 and 2014, and I confirm all of them
formally in the next section.
Problem Existence & Vanishing Problem
Consider evidence for the problem existence (1) and vanishing problem (4) hypothe-
ses. First, the problem existence (1) hypothesis predicts that receiving the cumulative
American body count during a war will decrease a citizen’s evaluation of the war.
Second, the vanishing problem (4) hypothesis predicts that receiving the cumulative
American body count during a war will decrease a citizen’s evaluation of the war at
a decreasing rate. Consistent with both of these hypotheses, receiving the cumula-
tive American body count at the third survey panel corresponding to the year 2015
decreases subjects’ mean grade from B to C and at all subsequent survey panels cor-
responding to later years similarly decreases subjects’ mean grade by one full letter.
In this case, the decreasing rate at which a citizen’s evaluation of the war decreases
over time drops to zero instantaneously at the third survey panel corresponding to
the year 2015.
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Solution Existence & Vanishing Solution
Consider evidence for the solution existence (2) and vanishing solution (5) hypotheses.
First, the solution existence (2) hypothesis predicts that receiving the cumulative
enemy body count during a war will increase a citizen’s evaluation of the war. Second,
the vanishing solution (5) hypothesis predicts that receiving the cumulative enemy
body count during a war will increase a citizen’s evaluation of the war at a decreasing
rate. Inconsistent with both of these hypotheses, receiving the cumulative enemy
body count at the third survey panel corresponding to the year 2015 nor at any
subsequent survey panels corresponding to later years changes subjects’ mean grade.
Prima facie, this result suggests that Boettcher and Cobb (2006) proposes a solution
that does not work: the military cannot increase the public’s evaluation of a war by
reporting the increasing enemy body count. But Boettcher and Cobb (2006) would
disagree with this suggestion: it is possible that the military can increase the public’s
evaluation of a war by reporting the increasing enemy body count but only in addition
to reporting the increasing American body count—the efficacy of the former requiring
the context of the latter. The next result evaluates this claim and provides a better
test of the claim of Boettcher and Cobb (2006).
Effective Solution & Convergence
Consider evidence for the solution effective (3) and convergence (6) hypotheses. First,
the solution existence (3) hypothesis predicts that receiving the cumulative enemy
body count along with the cumulative American body count will increase a citizen’s
evaluation of the war compared to receiving the cumulative American body count
without the cumulative enemy body count. Second, the convergence hypothesis (6)
predicts that citizens’ evaluation of the war will converge to some value over time.
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Consistent with both of these hypotheses, receiving the cumulative enemy body count
along with the cumulative American body count at the third survey panel correspond-
ing to the year 2015 increases subjects’ mean grade from C to B- and at all subsequent
survey panels corresponding to later years similarly increases subjects’ mean grade
by two-thirds of one full letter with convergence to an approximate mean grade of B-.
This result suggests that Boettcher and Cobb (2006) proposes a solution that does
indeed work and requires two pieces of information that contextualize each other: the
military can increase the public’s evaluation of a wary by reporting the increasing
enemy body count but only in addition to the increasing American body count.
2.5.1 Formal Tests
In this section, I present the results of my analysis rigorously. Each of the figures plots
the difference in mean grades between subjects assigned to two different experimental
groups at each of the thirteen panels and corresponding years, accompanied by ninety
percent confidence bands from Welch unequal variance t-tests. At a given panel
and corresponding year, confidence bands for the difference in mean grades that do
not cross zero indicate a statistically significant difference. For any two panels and
corresponding years, confidence bands for the difference in mean grades that overlap
indicate no statistically significant change in the difference in mean grades from the
first panel and corresponding year to the second one. The variable Grade T measures
a subject’s mean grade for a war on a 13-point scale of integers from “1” (equivalent
to “F”) to “13” (equivalent to “A+”), inclusive, with a greater value corresponding
to a higher grade.
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(b) Cumulative Body Counts
Figure 2.1. Mean Grade and Cumulative Body Counts. Subfigure (a) plots for each survey
panel and corresponding year the mean grade of subjects assigned to the control group (C) (given
by C), those assigned to the first treatment group (T1) who additionally received on each survey
panel the cumulative American body count at the corresponding year (given by A), those assigned to
the the second treatment group (T2) who additionally received on each survey panel the cumulative
enemy body count at the corresponding year (given by E), and those assigned to the third treatment
group (T3) who additional received on each survey panel both body counts at the corresponding year
(given by B). Subfigure (b) plots for each panel and corresponding year the cumulative American
body count (given by A) and the cumulative enemy body count (given by E).
Problem Existence & Vanishing Problem
Consider Figure 2.2a, which plots for each of the thirteen panels and corresponding
years the difference in mean grades between subjects assigned to the control group
(C) and subjects assigned to the first treatment group (T1) who additionally received
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on each survey panel the cumulative American body count at the corresponding year.
At the third survey panel corresponding to the year 2015, receiving the cumulative
American body count decreases subjects’ mean grade relative to the control condi-
tion. However, at subsequent survey panels and corresponding years over which the
American body count increases, receiving the cumulative American body count does
not decrease subjects’ mean grade any further. These results are consistent with the
problem existence (1) and vanishing problem (4) hypotheses.
Solution Existence & Vanishing Solution
Consider Figure 2.3a, which plots for each of the thirteen panels and corresponding
years the difference in mean grades between subjects assigned to the control group
(C) and subjects assigned to the second treatment group (T2) who additionally re-
ceived on each panel the cumulative enemy body count at the corresponding year.
With the exception of the second survey panel corresponding to the year 2014, at all
survey panels and corresponding years, receiving the cumulative enemy body count
does not change subjects’ mean grade relative to the control condition. This re-
sult is inconsistent with both the solution existence (2) and vanishing solution (5)
hypotheses.
Effective Solution & Convergence
Consider Figure 2.2b, which plots for each of the thirteen panels and corresponding
years the difference in mean grades between subjects assigned to the first treatment
group (T1) who additionally received on each survey panel the cumulative American
body count at the corresponding year and subjects assigned to the third treatment
group (T3) who additionally received on each survey panel both the cumulative Amer-
ican body count and the cumulative enemy body count at the corresponding year.
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(a) Neither (C) to Only American (T1)
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(b) Only American (T1) to Both (T3)
Figure 2.2. Neither (C) to Only American (T2) to Both (T3). Subfigure (a) plots for
each survey panel and corresponding year the difference in the mean grade (where each difference
of 1-point equates to a difference in one step on the ordered scale between “F” and “A+”) between
subjects assigned to the control group (C) and subjects assigned to the first treatment group (T1)
who additionally received on each survey panel the cumulative American body count at the corre-
sponding year. Subfigure (b) plots for each survey panel and corresponding year the difference in
the mean grade between subjects assigned to the first treatment group (T1) and subjects assigned to
the third treatment group (T3) who additionally received on each survey panel both the cumulative
American body count and the cumulative enemy body count at the corresponding year. Ninety
percent confidence bands from a Welch unequal variance t-test.
At the third panel corresponding to the year 2015, receiving the cumulative enemy
cumulative body count along with the American cumulative body count increases
subjects’ mean grade relative to receiving just the American body count. However,
at subsequent survey panels and corresponding years over which both the American
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(b) Only Enemy (T2) to Both (T3)
Figure 2.3. Neither (C) to Only Enemy (T2) to Both (T3). Subfigure (a) plots for each
survey panel and corresponding year the difference in the mean grade where each difference of 1-
point equates to a difference in one step on the ordered scale between “F” and “A+”) between
subjects assigned to the control group (C) who did not receive anything else and subjects assigned
to the second treatment group (T2) who additionally received on each survey panel the cumulative
enemy body count at the corresponding year. Subfigure (b) plots for each panel and corresponding
year the difference in the mean grade between subjects assigned to the second treatment group
(T2) and subjects assigned to the third treatment group (T3) who additionally received on each
survey panel both the cumulative American body count and the cumulative enemy body count at
the corresponding year. Ninety percent confidence bands from a Welch unequal variance t-test.
body count and the enemy body count increase, receiving the enemy body count
along with the American body count does not increase subjects’ mean grade any fur-
ther. These results are consistent with the effective solution (3) and convergence (6)
hypotheses.
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Now consider figure 2.4, which plots for each of the thirteen survey panels and
corresponding years the difference in mean grades between subjects assigned to the
control group (C) and subjects assigned to the third treatment group (T3) who ad-
ditionally received on each survey panel both the cumulative American body count
and the cumulative enemy body count at the corresponding year. With the exception
of the second and fifth panels corresponding to the years 2014 and 2017, respec-
tively, at all other panels and corresponding years, receiving the cumulative enemy
body count along with the cumulative American body count decreases subjects’ mean
grade relative to the control condition. The previous result indicates that receiving
the cumulative enemy body count along with the cumulative American body count
increases subject’ mean grade relative to receiving just the American body count.
The present result indicates that receiving the enemy body count along with the cu-
mulative body count decreases subjects’ mean grade relative to the control condition.
This last result does not support a particular hypothesis. Rather, it shows that the
solution is effective but does not completely solve the problem—subjects’ give the
highest mean grades when American casualties are not reported, the second-highest
when American casualties are reported along with enemy casualties, and the lowest
when American casualties are reported alone.
2.6 Discussion & Conclusion
In this section, I present the three major findings from my analysis. Recall that
my goal in this paper is similar to that of Gartner (2008): to elucidate the micro
foundations of public opinion during war. Gartner (2008) states that “reexamining
the same historical wartime surveys is unlikely to generate a better understanding of
the micro-foundations of wartime behavior” and instead uses survey experiments in
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Figure 2.4. Neither (C) to Both (T3) The figure plots for each survey panel and corresponding
year the difference in the mean grade where each difference of 1-point equates to a difference in
one step on the ordered scale between “F” and “A+”) between subjects assigned to the control
group (C) and subjects assigned to the third treatment group (T3) who additionally received on
each survey panel both the cumulative American body count and the cumulative enemy body count
at the corresponding year. Ninety percent confidence bands from a Welch unequal variance t-test.
the context of hypothetical wars to do so. I have done the same. But in the process,
both Gartner (2008) and I have traded off external validity for internal validity in
the pursuit of our research objectives. This bargain struck limits our insight into how
our results translate into the real world—a question for future research—but I take
a stab at it in this section.
First, the problem in question exists but is limited. The military must report the
ever-increasing American body count continuously, but doing so does not continuously
decrease the public’s evaluation of a war (relative to the public’s evaluation when the
military reports nothing else). Rather, the public’s evaluation decreases in response to
one of the military’s first reports on the American body count, but subsequent reports
do not decrease it any further (relative to the public’s evaluation when the military
reports nothing else). In the panel experiment, receiving the cumulative American
body count at the third panel corresponding to the year 2015 decreases subjects’
mean grade by approximately one full letter grade (e.g., from B to C) relative to not
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receiving anything else. However, receiving the cumulative American body count at
subsequent panels and corresponding years does not decrease subjects’ mean grade
any further than this—the decrease is always one full letter grade. This suggests
that the public’s evaluation of a war decreases in response to one of the military’s
first reports on the American body count, but subsequent reports do not decrease
it any further. This finding is not only consistent with the theory presented in this
paper but also nearly consistent with one of the earliest theories on the impact of
increasing American casualties from the 1970s: the “log of casualties” theory. Mueller
(1971, 1973) claims that the public’s war support is decreasing in the logarithm of the
cumulative American casualties. But this claim implies by the nature of the logarithm
function that the marginal negative impact of additional American casualties on war
support necessarily declines over time—possibly to zero—which is what I find here.
Second, the solution under consideration does not completely solve the limited
problem in question. The military may report the ever-increasing enemy body count
along with the ever-increasing American body count continuously, but doing so does
not continuously increases the public’s evaluation of a war (relative to the public’s
evaluation when the military reports just the American body count continuously).
Rather, the public’s evaluation increases in response to one of the military’s first
reports on both body counts (relative to the public’s evaluation when the military
reports just the American body count), but subsequent reports do not increase it any
further. Further, the increase in the public’s evaluation from the military reporting
the enemy body count along with the American body count (relative to when the
military reports just the American body count) does not fully compensate for the
decrease from the military reporting the American body count at all. In the panel
experiment, receiving the cumulative enemy body count along with the cumulative
American body count at the third panel corresponding to the year 2015 increases
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subjects’ mean grade by approximately two-thirds of a full letter grade (e.g., from
C to B-) relative to receiving just the cumulative American body count. However,
receiving the cumulative enemy body count along with the cumulative American body
count at subsequent panels and corresponding years does not increase subjects’ mean
grade any further than this—the increase is always approximately two-thirds of a full
letter grade. And note that receiving the cumulative enemy body count along with
the cumulative American body count at the third panel corresponding to the year
2015 decreases subjects’ mean grade by approximately one-third of a full letter grade
(e.g., from B to B-) relative to receiving nothing else. The public’s evaluation of a
war increases in response to one of the military’s first reports on both body counts
(relative to the public’s evaluation when the military reports just the American body
count), but subsequent reports do not decrease it any further–the decrease is always
approximately one-third of a full letter grade. Altogether, this suggests that the
increase in the public’s evaluation of the war from the military reporting the enemy
body count along with the American body count (relative to when the military reports
just the American body count) does not fully compensate for the decrease from the
military reporting the American body count at all, falling short by one third of a full
letter grade.
Third, the limited solution under consideration does nothing without the limited
problem in question. Given that the military could report just the ever-increasing
enemy body count continuously, doing so would not change the public’s evaluation of
a war (relative to the public’s evaluation when the military reports nothing else). The
public’s evaluation of the war only changes in response to the military continuously
reporting both the enemy body count along with the American body count. In
the panel experiment, receiving just the cumulative enemy body count at any panel
and corresponding year does not change subjects’ mean grade relative to receiving
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nothing else—the public’s evaluation of a war does not change in response to the
military reporting just the enemy body count, without also reporting the American
body count. As discussed before, this result suggests that Boettcher and Cobb (2006)
is correct in its claim that the mechanism at play is the information on enemy body
count contextualizing information on the American body count, not the former having
an independent effect, although the latter certainly does.
There is a reason that “enemy death tolls have been a feature of war ever since
armies stuck heads on pikes” (Phillips, 2009). In this paper, I have shown two main
empirical results. First, as the military must continuously report the number of
casualties it sustains, the public’s evaluation of a war continuously decreases over
time at a rate that rapidly decelerates to zero and decreases no further—by about a
full letter grade on a scale from F to A+. Second, as the military continuously reports
the enemy body count along with the American body count, the public’s evaluation
of a war continuously increases over time relative to the public’s evaluation when the
military reports just the American body count at a rate that rapidly decelerates to
zero and increases no further—by about two-thirds of a full letter grade on the same
scale. As a result, the military can make the public evaluate a war more highly than
it would otherwise by reporting the enemy body count along with the American body
count. Reporting enemy death tolls, sticking heads on pikes—these strategies work.
The United States military wisely reverted back to these practices during its recent
engagements abroad.
But the two main results I have shown in this paper represent more than just
a basis for recommendations about the military’s practices during war—particularly
whether they should stick heads on pikes or not. First, as aforementioned, many
studies show both observationally and experimentally that the public’s evaluation of
a war decreases at any moment when the military reports the increasing American
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body count at that moment, but no studies show experimentally, although many
do observationally, that the public’s evaluation of the war decreases over time as
the military continuously reports the American body count over time—which I have
done here, for the first time. While Gartner (2008) comes closest, suggesting this
phenomenon, that study’s experimental design precludes demonstrating it. In this
paper, I demonstrate the phenomenon suggested by Gartner (2008) using a new
experimental design but in the same spirit. Second, as aforementioned, Boettcher and
Cobb (2006) suggests, but does not show either observationally or experimentally, that
the public’s evaluation of the war increases at any moment when the military reports
the increasing enemy body count in addition to the increasing American body count
at that moment, but no studies show experimentally that the public’s evaluation of
the war increases over time as the military continuously reports the increasing enemy
body count in addition to the increasing American body count over time—which I
have also done here for the first time.
But in this paper, my most important contribution may not be these two main
empirical results, but the paradigm that they suggest. Future research research should
add to our understanding of how events during a war cause public opinion across
time—dynamically—rather than just at one moment in time—statically—which past
research has already investigated. Lab, survey, and field experiments are the obvious
way to accomplish this, just as with other causal rather than correlative questions.
In this paper, taking this approach revealed the first causal rather than correlative
support for the theory of the elasticity of reality of Baum and Groeling (2010) from
dynamic experimental data rather than just dynamic observational data. Most critical
for this research agenda—as well as the present study—is finding ways of extending
the operationalization of these experiments outside the lab and the survey and into
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the field—from where their results are internally valid to where they are externally
valid.
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Essay 3
Polarized Elites, Unpolarized Public:
Evidence from Two Survey Experiments
3.1 Introduction
Do polarized elites result in a polarized public? Scholars arguing in favor of what
Berinsky (2007, 2009) calls the elite-driven hypothesis answer this question with yes,
especially on the issue of the use of force abroad by the United States (inter alia, Belk-
nap and Campbell, 1951; Zaller, 1992; Larson, 1996; Berinsky, 2007, 2009; Baum and
Groeling, 2009b). The elite-driven hypothesis holds that a citizen uses the positions
of elites to choose his own position on a war.1
At the start of a war, the president supports the war and a citizen chooses the
same position as him and also supports it. At the same time, elites other than the
president might take a position either opposing or supporting the war but a citizen
ignores this information. This results in a “rally ’round the flag”: at the start of
a war, the public’s support for it increases regardless of elite dissensus or consensus
(Brody and Shapiro, 1991; Brody, 1991). But eventually this rally fades and a citizen
1Scholars arguing in favor of the event-response hypothesis critique this claim, arguing that a
citizen uses information about a war such as estimates of its casualties and monetary costs, its
probability of success, or its objective to choose his position (inter alia, Mueller, 1971, 1973; Lorell
et al., 1985; Jentleson, 1992; Larson, 1996; Gartner et al., 1997; Gartner and Segura, 1998; jen; Burk,
1999; Klarevas, 2000; Eichenberg, 2003; Feaver and Gelpi, 2004; Eichenberg, 2005; Gelpi et al., 2006;
Boettcher and Cobb, 2006; Fordham, 2008; Gartner, 2008; Gelpi et al., 2009).
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uses the positions of elites other than the president to choose his own position. How
a citizen does this depends on which elites take positions. In the first case, a two-
sided information flow, elites of one party support a war but elites in the other party
oppose it. Here elites are polarized. In this case, Zaller (1992) and Berinsky (2007,
2009) argue that a citizen chooses the same position as elites in his party, but this
equates to a citizen choosing the opposite position from elites in the other party. So
here the public is polarized. In the second case, a one-sided information flow, elites
of one party take a position on a war but elites of the other party do not. Here
elites are unpolarized. In this case, Berinsky (2007, 2009) argues one of two things
happens. Given elites in his party take a position but elites in the other party do
not, a citizen chooses the same position as elites in his party. On the other hand,
given elites in the other party take a position but elites in his party do not, a citizen
instead chooses the opposite position from elites in the other party. So here too the
public is polarized. The elite-driven hypothesis predicts only one outcome after the
war’s initial rally fades and as long as there is at least some position-taking by elites:
a polarized public. Polarized elites, polarized public. Unpolarized elites, polarized
public, too. This is the argument and the conclusion of the elite-driven hypothesis.
This conclusion is incomplete because the basic mechanism of the elite-driven
hypothesis—elite cues in the form of position-taking—does not allow the degree of
the public’s polarization on a war to differ during two-sided information flows—when
elites are polarized on the war—versus one-sided information flows—when elites are
unpolarized on it. But intuitively, two-sided information flows and polarized elites
should result in a greater degree of polarization in the public than one-sided infor-
mation flows and unpolarized elites do. Research in the “backlash” literature like
Nyhan and Reifler (2010) and Kriner and Howell (2012) not only show that this is
the case but also argue that a specific mechanism causes this: counterarguing. When
82
elites in the two parties take opposite positions from each other on a war—during
two-sided information flows and elite polarization—a citizen not only initially takes
on the same position as elites in his party but also counterargues that opposite po-
sition of elites in the other party so he ends up with an even more extreme position
than he would otherwise. But when elites in only one party take a position on a
war—during one-sided information flows and elite unpolarization—the citizen takes
on the same position as elites in his party but there is not an opposite position for him
to counterargue, so he ends up with the same position that he initially takes (Lodge
and Taber, 2000; Taber et al., 2001; Redlawsk, 2002; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Taber
et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2010; Strickland et al., 2011). Grafting this counterarguing
mechanism into the elite-driven hypothesis allows degrees of the public’s polarization
during different information flows and degrees of elite polarization in a way that is
intuitively expected. Unpolarized elites, polarized public—but polarized elites, even
more polarized public.
I disagree that this is always true. Perhaps counterintuitively, two-sided infor-
mation flows and polarized elites should result in a lesser degree of polarization in
the public than one-sided information flows and unpolarized elites do—at least some-
times. In this paper I show that this is the case and develop one possible mechanism
that might cause this: hedging. When elites in the two parties take opposite positions
from each other—during two-sided information flows and elite polarization—a citizen
not only initially takes the same position as elites in his party, but also hedges it
with that opposite position of elites in the other party, so he ends up with a more
moderate position than he would otherwise. But when elites in only one party take a
position on a war—during one-sided information flows and elite unpolarization—the
citizen takes on the same position as elites in his party but there is not an opposite
position for him to use as a hedge, so he ends up with the same position he initially
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takes. Grafting this hedging mechanism into the elite-driven hypothesis allows for
different degrees of the public’s polarization during different information flows and
degrees of elite polarization in a way that is not intuitively expected. Unpolarized
elites, polarized public—but polarized elites, even less polarized public.
To summarize, the original version of the elite-driven hypothesis predicts that
during two-sided information flows, the public is just as polarized as elites. But
with the counterarguing mechanism added, the elite-driven hypothesis instead pre-
dicts that during two-sided information flows the public is even more polarized than
elites. And with the hedging mechanism added, the elite-driven hypothesis intead
predicts that during two-sided information flows the public is even less polarized
than elites. Regardless of version, the elite-driven hypothesis predicts that during
one-sided information flows the public is just as polarized as elites.
The hedging effect that I propose in this paper—which predicts a more mod-
erate and less extreme public in response to elite polarization than the elite-driven
hypotheses does—is broadly consistent with recent literature showing that the Ameri-
can public not significantly more polarized now than it was in the early 1970s—despite
the fact that American political elites have become significantly more polarized over
this same time period (Fiorina and Abrams, 2008). First, in terms of ideological
self-classification, Fiorina (2016) shows that on American National Election Studies
(ANES), General Social Survey (GSS), and New York Times (NYT) / CBS News
time series asking respondents to classify themselves ideologically, there is no signifi-
cant change in the percent answering “moderate” or “don’t know” between 1972 and
2012. And second, in terms of ideological belief, the same study shows that on ANES
time series asking respondents to give their position on five policy issues, there is
no significant change in the distribution of answers across the ideological continuum
between 1984 and 2012. Many other studies show similar results suggesting that
84
there is no significant polarization of the American public over past four decades or
so in terms of ideological self-classification nor in terms of issue positions (see Fiorina
et al., 2005; Fiorina and Abrams, 2008; Abramowitz and Saunders, 2008; Fischer and
Mattson, 2009). This evidence contradicts one of the dominant frames of the Ameri-
can media and one of the dominant beliefs of the American public in modern times,
with both misperceiving—and in particular, overestimating—the level of polarization
and its rate of increase over time (Ahler, 2014; Levendusky and Malhotra, 2016a,b).
Perhaps the hedging effect attenuated the level of the American public’s polarization
as elites became more polarized over the last four decades—but it is certainly beyond
the scope of this paper to show—and this is a task I leave for future research.
In the remainder of this paper, I accomplish two main tasks. First, I develop
a theoretical extension of the elite-driven hypothesis, the hedging effect. Again, I
emphasize here that there are other possible theoretical extensions of the elite-driven
hypothesis besides the hedging effect that might also explain the degree of the public’s
polarization during two-sided information flows, but I leave the task of empirically
adjudicating among these possibilities for future research. Second, I test the original
version of the elite-driven hypothesis, the version with the backlash effect, and the
version with the hedging effect using data I obtained from two original survey exper-
iments in the context of the Libyan Civil War of 2011. The version of the elite-driven
hypothesis with the hedging effect performs the best of the three based on the general
pattern of empirical results.
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3.2 Elite Cues
3.2.1 How Citizens Choose Positions
How does a citizen choose his position on a war? Before he chooses his position, a
citizen first chooses to gather and cognitively process some quantity of information.
As the quantity he chooses increases, the “correctness” of the position he later chooses
also increases, yielding more benefit. However, as the quantity he chooses increases,
his effort in information gathering and cognitive processing also increases, yielding
more cost. A citizen chooses the quantity that maximizes his net benefit, his benefit
less his cost (Downs, 1957). A citizen trades off the correctness of the position he
later chooses and his effort in information gathering and cognitive processing.
The effort in information gathering and cognitive processing is obviously a cost to
a citizen—but why is the correctness of his position a benefit to him? According to
Taber and Lodge (2006), people are motivated by “accuracy goals, which motivate
them to seek out and carefully consider relevant evidence so as to reach a correct or
otherwise best conclusion” (p. 756; also see Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Baumeister and
Newman, 1994). Here a citizen values the correctness of the position that he chooses
as a benefit because this correctness satisfies his accuracy goals (see Kunda, 1987,
1990; Chaiken and Trope, 1999). Of course this also begs the question: what is a
“correct or otherwise best conclusion” here and why do they have accuracy goals?
My answer would be—at least in the context here—that a correct position is one in a
citizen’s interest and he chooses it over other positions because of this (also see Lupia
and McCubbins, 1998).
A citizen achieves the greatest correctness of the position he later chooses and
incurs the least effort in information gathering and cognitive processing—maximizing
his net benefit—using just a a single, special piece of information: a heuristic, or
86
shortcut (Chaiken, 1980; Mondak, 1993b; Popkin, 1991; Sniderman et al., 1991; Lupia,
1994; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Lau and Redlawsk, 1997; Cutler, 2002; Kam, 2005;
Lau and Redlawsk, 2006; Boudreau, 2009). Thus when available a citizen chooses
his position using a heuristic and ignores all other pieces of information—and this
behavior is rational. Of course there is one possible exception where a citizen does
not use a heuristic—or any other piece of information—to choose his position: when
the net benefit from doing so is negative. This means that the benefit he gains in
position correctness from using the heuristic is less than the cost he incurs in effort to
gather and cognitively process it. In this case, a citizen remains ignorant—and this
behavior is also rational.
Elites’ positions on a war are such a heuristic, and thus a citizen almost always
chooses to gather and cognitively process it when it is available (Rahn, 1993; Mondak,
1993a; Druckman, 2001; Cohen, 2003; Bullock, 2009; Nicholson, 2011; Hayes and
Guardino, 2011; Nicholson, 2012; Druckman et al., 2012). Considered as a heuristic,
elites’ positions are called elite cues. A citizen believes that elites in his party are
more knowledgeable than him and share common interests with him (Lupia and
McCubbins, 1998). Thus, a citizen also believes that elites in his party take a correct
position on a war. As a result, a citizen chooses the same position on a war as
elites in his party. Similarly, a citizen believes that elites in the other party are more
knowledgeable than him but share no common interests with him. Thus, a citizen
also believes that elites in the other party take an incorrect position on a war. As a
result, a citizen chooses the opposite position on a war from elites in the other party
(Berinsky, 2007, 2009).
In the following two sections, I specify which position on a war a citizen chooses
under the two interesting configurations of elite position-taking on it. In the first
configuration, a one-sided information flow, elites of one party take a position on
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a war but elites in the other party do not. The expected outcome from this first
configuration follows from the argument of the heuristics literature in the preceding
paragraph. In the second configuration, a two-sided information flow, elites of one
party support a war but elites of the other party oppose it. The expected outcome
from this second configuration follows from the argument of the heuristics literature
as well, but the backlash literature offers a competing argument and expectation, and
so do I.
The explanation in the following two sections concerns how a citizen chooses his
position on a war only after the “rally ’round the flag” effect fades (again see Brody
and Shapiro, 1991; Brody, 1991). At the start of a war a citizen chooses the same
position on a war as the president does—support—regardless of which positions non-
presidential elites take, causing an initial rally in the public’s support. But eventually
a citizen chooses his position on the war based on the positions that non-presidential
elites take—opposition or support—regardless of the president’s support position,
causing the initial rally to fade. Again, the theory in the next two sections only
applies to the second, post-rally phase of a war.
3.2.2 One-Sided Information Flows
In the case of one-sided information flows, when elites of one party take a position on
a war but elites of the other party do not, which position does a citizen choose? Using
the argument of the previous section, Berinsky (2007, 2009) predicts an outcome in
this case.2 First, given elites in his party take a position and elites in the other party
2Zaller (1992) predicts the same outcome as Berinsky (2007, 2009) does in the first of these cases:
if elites in a citizen’s party take a position on a war but elites in the other party do not, then he
chooses the same position as elites in his party. But Zaller’s receive-accept-sample (RAS) theory
predicts that nothing happens in the second of these cases: if elites in the other party take a position
on a war but elites in a citizen’s party do not, then his position does not change. This is in fact the
main motivation for Berinsky’s development of elite cue theory (ECT) as a refinement of Zaller’s
RAS theory.
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do not, a citizen chooses the same position as elites in his party, following their correct
position. Second, given elites in the other party take a position and elites in his party
do not, a citizen chooses the opposite position from elites in the other party, avoiding
their incorrect position. Thus, when Democratic elites support a war and Republican
elites do not take a position on it, a Democratic citizen supports it, following the
correct position, but a Republican citizen opposes it, avoiding the incorrect position.
Similarly, when Democratic elites do not take a position on a war and Republican
elites oppose it, a Democratic citizen support it, avoiding the incorrect position, but
a Republican citizens supports it, following the correct position.
Hypothesis 1 (Support). If Democratic elites support a war and Republican elites do
not take a position on it, then Democratic citizens support it and Republican citizens
oppose it.
Hypothesis 2 (Opposition). If Democratic elites do not take a position on a war
and Republican elites oppose it, then Democratic citizens support it and Republican
citizen oppose it.
3.2.3 Two-Sided Information Flows
In the case of two-sided information flows, when the elites of one party support a war
but the elites of the other party oppose it, which position does a citizen choose? The
heuristics literature, the backlash literature, and I offer three competing arguments
which predict three different outcomes in this case.
Heuristics
The heuristics literature predicts the same outcome in the case of two-sided informa-
tion flows as it does in the case of one-sided information flows. A citizen chooses the
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same position as elites in his party, following their correct position. But at the same
time, a citizen chooses the opposite position from elites in the other party, avoiding
their incorrect position. These two mechanisms operating during two-sided informa-
tion flows result in a citizen taking the exact same position, though—so there is no
need to adjudicate which one dominates here, although it is certainly an interesting
question for future research to answer. This logic implies that when Democratic elites
support a war and Republican elites oppose it, a Democratic citizen supports it—from
his perspective, following the correct position of Democratic elites in his party and
avoiding the incorrect position of Republican elites in the other party—but a Repub-
lican citizen opposes the war—from his perspective, following the correct position of
Republican elites in his party and avoiding the incorrect position of Democratic elites
in the other party.
Hypothesis 3 (Heuristics). If Democratic elites support a war and Republican elites
oppose it, then Democratic citizens support it and Republican citizens oppose it the
same as they do in the case of one-sided information flows.
Backlash
One interpretation of the backlash literature predicts a different outcome in the case
of two-sided information flows than the heuristics literature does. Nyhan and Rei-
fler (2010) summarize the typical version of what they call the “backfire” effect as
follows: “individuals who receive unwelcome information may not simply resist chal-
lenges to their views. Instead, they may come to support their original opinion even
more strongly” (p. 307). This process consists of two steps. As a first step, like the
prediction of the heuristics literature, a citizen chooses the same position as elites in
his party, following their correct position. But as a second step, unlike the prediction
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of the heuristics literature, a citizen then counterargues the incorrect position of the
elites in the other party (Taber and Lodge, 2006; Taber et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2010;
Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Strickland et al., 2011; Kriner and Howell, 2012). As a result
of this second step, a citizen maintains and reinforces the position he chose in the
first step, and he ultimately chooses a position more extreme than he does in the case
of a one-sided information flow (Miller and Ross, 1975; Lord et al., 1979; Ditto and
Lopez, 1992; Edwards and Smith, 1996; Kruglanski and Webster, 1996; Ditto et al.,
1998; Rudolph, 2006; Meffert et al., 2006; Lebo and Cassino, 2007; Gollust et al.,
2009; Redlawsk et al., 2010). Here I apply to elite position-taking a phenomenon
Nyhan and Reifler (2010) and Kriner and Howell (2012) call a backlash effect (also
see Taber and Lodge, 2006; Baum and Groeling, 2009a; Slothuus and de Vreese, 2010;
Grieco et al., 2011). According to Taber and Lodge (2006), people are motivated by
“partisan goals, which motivate them to apply their reasoning powers in defense of a
prior, specific conclusion” (p. 756; also see Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Baumeister and
Newman, 1994). In the first step of this process, people acquire a prior. And in the
second step of this process, people defend their prior and “vigorously counterargue
incongruent evidence” in the form of the position-taking of elites in the other party
and “become attitudinally more extreme” than their prior (Taber and Lodge, 2006, p.
756). As a result of this process, when Democratic elites support a war and Republi-
can elites oppose it, a Democratic citizen supports it—from his perspective, following
the correct position of Democratic elites in his party and avoiding the incorrect po-
sition of Republican elites in the other party—and a Republican citizen opposes the
war—from his perspective, following the correct position of Republican elites in his
party and avoiding the incorrect position of Democratic elites in the other party—
even more strongly than they do when elites of only one party take a position—in
which a citizen can acquire a prior but there is no second elite position to counter-
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argue. This interpretation of the backlash literature predicts that the outcome from
two-sided information flows is more extreme than than the one that the heuristics
literature predicts.
Hypothesis 4 (Backlash). If Democratic elites support a war and Republican elites
oppose it, then Democratic citizens support it and Republican citizens oppose it more
strongly than in the case of a one-sided information flow.
To clarify, what I describe above is a modified version of the backlash effect which
differs from the typical version of it. In the typical version, people already have a
prior position on a war and then receive a single piece of information incongruent
with it that they counterargue rather than resist—the position of elites in the other
party—moving to a posterior position that is more extreme than their prior position.
But in my modified version here, two things happen. This typical version consists of
just one impact on people’s position. First, those people receive a piece of information
that they accept—the position of elites in their party—acquiring or making salient
a prior position, and moving to a more extreme position than before. Second, these
people then receive a piece of information incongruent with their prior position that
they then counterargue rather than resist—the position of elites in the other party—
moving to a posterior position that is even more extreme than their prior position.
This modified version consists two impacts on people’s position that accumulate and
together should be larger than the single impact of the typical version—but these
versions of the backlash effect do not contradict each other although they are certainly
different. My modified version simply accounts for the fact that the acquisition of or
the making salient of a prior position is a necessary condition for counterarguing—
and thus for any manifestation of the backlash mechanism. This modified version
also brings the backlash mechanism up to conceptual parity with both the heuristics
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and hedging mechanisms. But I do not develop this modified version of the backlash
effect any further here because it is neither the central theoretical contribution of this
paper nor is there evidence of it in this paper’s empirical results.
3.2.4 Hedging
I predict a different outcome in the case of two-sided information flows from either
the heuristics literature or the backlash literature. This process consists of two steps.
As a first step, like the prediction of either of these literatures, a citizen chooses the
same position as elites in his party, following their correct position. But as a second
step, unlike the predictions of either of these literatures, a citizen then hedges his
chosen position using the opposite position, the incorrect position of the elites in
the other party. As a result of this second step, a citizen weakens the position he
chose in the first step, and he ultimately chooses a position less extreme than he does
in the case of a one-sided information flow. Here I apply to elite position-taking a
phenomenon I call the hedging effect. I will elaborate on the microfoundations of this
hedging effect below—which is a complex mechanism—but essentially one can think
of it as the citizen choosing a position that is some weighted average of the the correct
position of elites in his party and the incorrect opposite position of elites in the other
party. And as a result of this process, when Democratic elites support a war and
Republican elites oppose it, a Democratic citizen supports it—from his perspective,
following the correct position of Democratic elites in his party and hedging it with the
incorrect position of Republican elites in the other party—and a Republican citizen
opposes the war—from his perspective, following the correct position of Republican
elites in his party and hedging it with the incorrect position of Democratic elites in
the other party—even more weakly than they do when elites of only one party take a
position—in which a citizen can acquire a prior but there is no second elite position
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with which to hedge. I predict that the outcome from two-sided information flows is
less extreme than than the one that either the heuristics literature or the backlash
literature predicts.
Hypothesis 5 (Hedging). If Democratic elites support a war and Republican elites
oppose it, then Democratic citizens support it and Republican citizens oppose it more
weakly than in the case of a one-sided information flow.
One reasonable argument against the hedging mechanism might be that it seems—
in general—to contradict the resistance axiom of the receive-accept-sample (RAS)
model of Zaller (1992). The resistance axiom—verbatim but with emphasis mine—
is the following: “People tend to resist arguments that are inconsistent with their
political predispositions, but they do so only to the extent that they possess the
contextual information necessary to perceive a relationship between messages and
their predispositions” (Zaller, 1992, p. 45). In the context of this paper, one could
apply the resistance axiom straightway: messages are elite positions as elite cues, the
contextual information necessary is information about elite partisanship as well as
comprehending its meaning, and a citizen’s predispositions are his interests.
So this application of the resistance axiom predicts two different outcomes in the
case of two-sided information flows depending on whether the citizen has contextual
information in the form of elite partisanship and comprehension of it—or not. If
the citizen has this contextual information, he is resistant and accepts the cues from
elites in his own party and their position becomes one of his considerations but resists
the cues from elites in the other party and their position does not become one of
his considerations—so his own position moves toward the elites of his own party and
away from those in the other party. On the other hand, if the citizen is unresistant
and does not have this contextual information, he accepts the cues from elites in
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his own party and their position becomes one of his considerations and he accepts
the cues from elites in the other party and their position also become one of his
considerations—so his own position moves somewhere between the elites of his own
party and those in the other party. And recall the single outcome that a similar
application of the hedging mechanism predicts in the case of two-sided information
flows: the citizen first takes on the same position as elites in his own party but then
hedges his position with the position of elites in the other party, ultimately taking on
a position between the elites of his own party and those in the other party.
What’s the contradiction between the hedging mechanism and the resistance ax-
iom as applied in the context of this paper? In the case of two-sided information flows,
the hedging mechanism predicts that a citizen takes a moderate position somewhere
between his own party and the other party. In the same case, while the resistance
axiom predicts that the citizen without the necessary contextual information takes a
moderate position somewhere between his own party and the other party, too, the
resistance axiom also predicts that the citizen with the necessary contextual informa-
tion takes an extreme position that is the same as his own party and the opposite
from the other party. In sum, under the resistance axiom, the necessary contextual
information conditions the impact of two-sided information flows on the position-
taking of citizens, but no such conditioning occurs under the hedging mechanism.
So empirically, it should be possible to adjudicate between the resistance axiom and
the hedging mechanism and resolve the contradiction between them as long as there
exists a measure for a research subject having this necessary contextual information
or not, and Zaller (1992) suggests that “political knowledge—that is, a person’s sum-
mary score across a series of neutral, factual tests of public affairs knowledge” (p. 43)
is one such proxy. I do so in an appendix and find relatively little evidence for the
resistance axiom—although future research should pursue a more intentional test of
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these competing explanations with a larger sample that allows better investigation of
subgroup impacts.
3.2.5 How Polarized Is the Public?
To summarize, the heuristics hypothesis (3), the backlash hypothesis (4), and the
hedging hypothesis (5) predict different degrees of the public’s polarization when elites
are polarized during a two-sided information flow—when Democratic elites support a
war and Republican elites oppose it—compared to when elites are unpolarized during
a one-sided information flow—when Democratic elites support the war or Republican
elites oppose it but not both. First, under the heuristics hypothesis, the public is
just as polarized as elites during a two-sided information flow, which I call moderate
polarization—Democratic citizens have moderate support and Republican citizens
have moderate opposition to the war, so the public’s polarization is also moderate.
Second, under the backlash hypothesis, the public is even more polarized than elites
during the two-sided information flow, which I call strong polarization—Democratic
citizens have strong support and Republican citizens have strong opposition to the
war, so the public’s polarization is also strong. Third, under the hedging hypothesis,
the public is less polarized than elites during the two-sided information flow, which
I call weak polarization—Democratic citizens have weak support and Republican
citizens have weak opposition to the war, so the public’s polarization is also weak.
I summarize these expectations of the three hypotheses that predict the public’s
polarization relative to that of political elites in Table 3.1 below. I now turn to the
central theoretical task for this paper: developing the microfoundations of the hedging
mechanism that I propose here.
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Heuristics Backlash Hedging
Democrats Moderate Support Strong Support Weak Support
Republicans Moderate Opposition Strong Opposition Weak Opposition
Polarization Moderate Strong Weak
Table 3.1. Public’s polarization during a elite polarization and two-sided information
flow. The three hypotheses discussed in this paper (columns) predict different levels of support for
a war among Democratic citizens and opposition to the war among Republican citizens (first two
rows) during elite polarization and a two-sided information flow when Democratic elites support the
war and Republican elites oppose it. The predictions of these three hypotheses (columns) also imply
different degrees of the public’s polarization during this elite polarization and two-sided information
flow (last row).
3.3 The Hedging Effect
Recall from the previous section that a citizen chooses his position on a war using
the heuristic of elite cues when available—taking on the “correct” position of elites
in his party and the opposite position from the “incorrect” position of elites in the
other party—and in doing so achieving the twin goals of maximizing the accuracy of
his taken position while minimizing the cost of gathering and cognitively processing
information (inter alia, Downs, 1957; Lupia and McCubbins, 1998; Taber and Lodge,
2006). Certainly this position-taking procedure minimizes the information cost for
the citizen—his first goal—but does it really always maximize the accuracy of his
taken position—his second goal? Consider two possibilities in which the answer to
this question is no.
First, it is possible that the position on a war of elites in a citizen’s party is
sometimes actually “incorrect” for him. That is, they might not know more about
the war than him or not share his interests with respect to it, and so taking on their
position as his usual position-taking procedure prescribes actually fails to maximize
accuracy and fails to achieve his goal. Second, it is possible that the position on a
war of elites in the other party from a citizen is sometimes actually “correct” for him.
That is, they might know more about a war than him and share his interests with
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respect to it, so taking on the opposite position from them as his position-taking
procedure prescribes actually fails to maximize accuracy and fails to achieve his goal.
The rational citizen recognizing either of these two possibilities—however small or
large their probabilities—would incorporate them into how he chooses his position on
a war (Downs, 1957). I speculate here about one way he might do this. Essentially,
his recognition means that he knows a risk exists that the position of elites in his
party is “incorrect” for him, and so taking on the opposite position from them actu-
ally maximizes accuracy and achieves his goal, contrary to his usual position-taking
procedure. And his recognition here also means that he knows a risk exists that the
position of elites in the other party is “correct” for him, and so taking on their position
similarly maximizes accuracy and achieves his goal, again contrary to his position-
taking procedure. The rational citizen could respond to his recognition of these risks
by altering his position-taking procedure to mitigate them—and one risk-mitigation
strategy pursued by rational agents in other domains is hedging (Mas-Colell et al.,
1995).
3.3.1 Hedging an Investment
What is hedging in general? The term comes from finance and, in particular, investing
(inter alia, Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Sharpe et al., 1999), and I illustrate hedging in
this context by way of example to fix ideas, although there is no loss of generality
here. An investor hedges a first asset he owns when he buys a different second asset
in order to offset an adverse change in the price of the first asset. An investor faces
the following problem.
• He must completely invest $2.
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• There are only two available assets A and B. Each of these two assets has a
price of $1. He can buy multiples of the same asset but not fractions of them.
• Immediately after he buys, the price of one asset will decrease to $0 and the
price of the other asset will increase to $2. The prices of these two assets will
never change again.
What should an investor do if he wants to maximize the value of his portfolio of
assets as well as minimize the volatility of this value? He can only do three things
here: buy two units of asset A, buy two units of asset B, or buy one unit of asset
A and one unit of asset B. In the first two strategies—buying two units of asset A
or two units of asset B—his portfolio has a value of either $0 or $4—either losing
the initial $2 investment or doubling it. I call these two strategies “unhedged A”
and “unhedged B.” And in the third and last strategy, his portfolio has a guaranteed
value of $2—preserving the initial $2 investment. I call this strategy “hedged AB.”
An investor has a portfolio worth $0 or $4 from following the unhedged A or unhedged
B strategies—these are volatile lotteries in which his portfolio either loses all its value
or doubles it. And the investor has a portfolio worth $2 from following the hedged
AB strategy—this is a certainty in which his portfolio maintains its value.
Consider first the unhedged strategies. If asset A has a relatively high probabil-
ity of doubling in price (and equivalently asset B dropping to zero price), then the
unhedged A strategy has a relatively high probability of yielding a portfolio worth
$4 instead of $0. But asset A still has some relatively low probability of dropping
to zero price (and equivalently asset B doubling in price), so the unhedged strategy
A still has some relatively low probability of yielding a portfolio worth $0 instead
of $4. A similar reasoning applies to asset B having a relatively high probability
of doubling in price (and equivalently asset B dropping to zero price). Thus these
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unhedged strategies yield portfolios with values that are volatile—both the best and
worst outcomes are possible.
Now consider the hedged strategy. A citizen can reduce the volatility of his port-
folio’s value by following the hedged strategy. Regardless of whether asset A or asset
B has a relatively high probability of doubling in price (and the other asset dropping
to zero price), the hedged AB strategy yields a portfolio worth $2 with certainty.
The maintained value of this portfolio has no volatility whatsoever—but neither the
best nor worst outcomes are possible like they are in the case of the two unhedged
strategies.
So which of the three strategies does an investor choose? Between the two un-
hedged strategies, he rationally chooses the one that has a relatively high probability
of yielding a portfolio worth $4 instead of $0. And between the hedged strategies and
the better of the unhedged strategies, which one he rationally chooses depends on
his risk-reward preference. If he is sufficiently risk averse, he rationally chooses the
the hedged strategy over the better of the unhedged strategies because the former
yields a portfolio worth less but also less volatile in value. And if he is sufficiently
risk seeking, he rationally chooses the better of the unhedged strategies because the
former yields a portfolio worth more value but also more volatility. Hedging reduces
both reward and risk while failure to hedge raises both risk and reward.
3.3.2 Hedging a Position
Now what is hedging in the sense I mean the term in this paper? A citizen hedges his
prior position—perhaps the same position as elites in his party—on a war when he
considers a different position—perhaps the same position as elites in the other party—
on it and takes on a posterior position somewhere between his prior and this different
position in order to reduce adverse changes in the accuracy of his prior position. This
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is completely analogous to hedging in the sense from finance and investing—except
the rational agent is a citizen instead of an investor and thinks about positions instead
of assets and accuracy instead of price. I illustrate the microfoundations of position
hedging by way of example to fix ideas, although there is no loss of generality here.
A citizen faces the following problem.
• He must allocate exactly two positions on a war to his “position portfolio.” The
average of the two positions in his portfolio is his expressed position.
• There are only two available positions A and B defined by elites. Elites in his
party take position A and elites in the other party take position B. He can
allocate multiples of the same position but not fractions of them.
• Immediately after he allocates, the accuracy of positions A and B are revealed:
one will have an accuracy of 0—zero accuracy—and the other an accuracy of
1—perfect accuracy. The average accuracy of the two positions in his portfolio
is its accuracy and that of his expressed position.
What should a citizen do if he wants to maximize the expected accuracy of his
position portfolio—and his expressed position—as well as minimize the volatility of
its accuracy? He can only do three things here: allocate position A twice, allocate
position B twice, or allocate position A once and allocate position B once to his
portfolio. In the first two strategies, allocating position A twice or allocating position
B twice, his portfolio has an accuracy of either 0 or 1—zero accuracy or total accuracy.
I call these two strategies “unhedged A” and “unhedged B.” And in the third and last
strategy, his portfolio has a guaranteed accuracy of 0.5—middling accuracy. I call this
strategy “hedged AB.” A citizens has a portfolio, and his expressed position, with an
accuracy of 0 or 1 from following the unhedged A or unhedged B strategies—these are
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volatile lotteries in which his portfolio has either zero accuracy or perfect accuracy.
And the citizen has a portfolio with an accuracy of 0.5 from following the hedged AB
strategy—this is a certainty in which his portfolio has middling accuracy.
Consider first the unhedged strategies. If position A has a relatively high proba-
bility of total accuracy (and equivalently position B having zero accuracy), then the
unhedged A strategy has a relatively high probability of yielding a portfolio with an
accuracy of 1 rather than 0. But position A still has some relatively low probability of
zero accuracy (and equivalently position B having total accuracy), so the unhedged
strategy A still has some relatively low probability of yielding a portfolio with an
accuracy of 0 rather than 1. A similar reasoning applies to position B having a rel-
atively high probability of total accuracy (and equivalently position A having zero
accuracy). Thus these unhedged strategies yield portfolios with accuracies that are
volatile—both the best and worst outcomes are possible.
Now consider the hedged strategy. A citizen can reduce the volatility of his portfo-
lio’s accuracy, and his expressed position, by following the hedged strategy. Regardless
of whether position A or position B has a relatively high probability of total accuracy
(and the other position zero accuracy), the hedged AB strategy yields a portfolio
with an accuracy of 0.5 with certainty. The middling accuracy of this portfolio has
no volatility whatsoever—but neither the best nor worst outcomes are possible like
they are in the case of the two unhedged strategies.
So which of the three strategies does a citizen choose? Between the two unhedged
strategies, he rationally chooses the one that has a relatively higher probability of
yielding a portfolio, an expressed position, with an accuracy of 1 rather than 0. And
between the hedged strategies and the better of the unhedged strategies, which one
he rationally chooses depends on his risk-reward preference. If he is sufficiently risk
averse, he rationally chooses the hedged strategy over the better of the unhedged
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strategies because the former yields a portfolio that has lower accuracy but also lower
volatility. And if he sufficiently risk seeking, he rationally chooses the better of the
unhedged strategies because the former yields a portfolio that has higher accuracy
but also higher volatility. The same thing is true here for position-taking as it is for
financial investing: hedging reduces both reward and risk while failure to hedge raises
both risk and reward.
3.4 Two Survey Experiments
I obtain data useful for testing these hypotheses—including the hedging effect—
through two survey experiments. Both survey experiments have a 2 × 2 fully crossed
design. The first factor is no exposure or exposure to a Democrat support cue, and
the second factor is no exposure or exposure to a Republican opposition cue. These
two factors result in a control condition and three treatment conditions: no exposure
to either cue, called “Neither Cue” or “C”; exposure to only a Democrat support cue,
called “Only Democrat Support Cue” or “T1”; exposure to only a Republican oppo-
sition cue, called “Only Republican opposition cue” or “T2”; and exposure to both
cues, called “Both Cues” or “T3.” The two survey experiments are exactly the same
except for the wars they use. One survey experiment uses the Libyan Civil War of
2011, while the other uses a hypothetical war based on it. A priori, I do not have firm
expectations about whether the results from these two survey experiments will dif-
fer or not, although some literature suggests they might (see Gelpi, 2010; Nicholson,
2012). I include these two survey experiments in this study mainly as a robustness
check.
The two survey experiments also measure subjects’ position on a war in an equiv-
alent way: a set of four questions that are exactly the same except for the war
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No Exposure Dem. Support Cue
No Exposure Neither Cue (C) Only Dem. Support Cue (T1)
Rep. Opposition Cue Only Rep. Opposition Cue (T2) Both Cues (T3)
Table 3.2. The design of the two survey experiments. The two survey experiment have
a 2 × 2 fully crossed design. The first factor is no exposure or exposure to a Democrat support
cue, and the second factor is no exposure or exposure to a Republican opposition cue. These two
factors result in a control condition and three treatment conditions: no exposure to either cue, called
“Neither Cue” or “C”; exposure to only a Democrat support cue, called “Only Democrat Support
Cue” or “T1”; exposure to only a Republican opposition cue, called “Only Republican opposition
cue” or “T2”; and exposure to both cues, called “Both Cues” or “T3.”
mentioned in each question. The four questions ask subjects about their approval of
a war, their approval of the president’s handling of the war, the “rightness” of the
war, and the level of U.S. involvement in the war. The literature on the use of force
disputes whether these four questions—among others—measure four separate dimen-
sions of war support or one common, underlying dimension of it (see Berinsky and
Druckman, 2007; Gelpi and Reifler, 2008). Since the arguable start of the modern
literature on the use of force with Mueller (1973) scholars have used multiple ques-
tions to measure war support in attempts to tap “a sort of generalized support for
war” (also see Burk, 1999, p. 43). A recent exception has been work by Christopher
Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler who concentrate on only one measure of war
support: individual casualty tolerance (among other works Gelpi et al., 2006, 2009).
Berinsky and Druckman (2007) critiques this approach—to which Gelpi and Reifler
(2008) responds. Resolving this dispute is not my purpose in this study so I not only
use four different questions to measure war support but also present the results for
all of them. The interested read can judge for himself here. In doing so, I follow the
conventional wisdom of the literature on the use of force articulated in Eichenberg
(2005): “a single question on any issue will be a misleading gauge of the public mood
because an infinite variety of question wordings on any issue is conceivable, and each
is likely to yield a different set of responses [...] a reliable analysis requires the study
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of many survey questions that employ a variety of wordings” (p. 153). Berinsky
and Druckman (2007) echoes this: “when examining generalized levels of support for
war—a concept measured only imperfectly by any single item—it is best to look at
multiple indicators of such support” (p. 5).
3.4.1 An Experiment Using a Hypothetical War
For the survey experiment using a hypothetical war, I used Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk to recruit a nonprobability sample of 420 subjects to complete “a 23-question
opinion survey on U.S. military action abroad” and used Qualtrics to collect their
responses from June 26, 2012 through July 3, 2012. I obtained 348 responses in total
because I eliminated the responses of subjects that failed to pass an instructional
manipulation check. This restriction does not significantly change the results in this
study.3
All subjects received the statement: “It is now the year 2023, and the United
States is deciding whether or not to support a NATO mission against a country
in Northern Africa.” The survey instrument then randomly assigned subjects to
either a control group or one of three treatment groups. Subjects in the control
group received neither a Democrat support cue nor a Republican opposition cue.
Subjects in the first treatment group received only a Democrat support cue given by
3In the survey experiment using a hypothetical war, the instructional manipulation check con-
sisted of a statement a question that all subjects received. The statement was: “Recent research
on decision making shows that choices are affected by context. Differences in how people feel, their
previous knowledge and experience, and their environment can affect choices. To help us understand
how people make decisions, we are interested in information about you. Specifically, we are inter-
ested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, some results may not tell
us very much about decision making in the real world. To show that you have read the instructions,
please ignore the question on the next slide and instead choose only the “successful” option as your
answer. ” The question following was: “Some people believe that the U.S. has been successful in
its operations in Afghanistan, while others believe we have not been so successful. How do you feel
about the progress the U.S. has made in Afghanistan?” The question had five possible responses:
“very unsuccessful,” “unsuccessful,” “evenly mixed,” “successful,” and “very successful.”
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the statement: “The Democrat President encouraged members of the U.S. House of
Representatives to vote in favor of a bill authorizing the limited use of the United
States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in this country. The vote
took place on November 14, 2023.” Subjects in the second treatment group received
only a Republican opposition cue given by the statement: “On November 14, 2023,
a majority of Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives voted against a bill
authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the
NATO mission in this country.” Subjects in the third treatment group received both
a Democrat support cue and a Republican opposition cue given by the statement:
“The Democrat President encouraged members of the U.S. House of Representatives
to vote in favor of a bill authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed
Forces in support of the NATO mission in this country. When the vote took place on
November 14, 2023, a majority of Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives
voted against the authorization bill.”
All subjects then received four questions in a randomized sequence that asked
them about their positions on this hypothetical war. The first question was: “Which
of the following best describes your feelings about the current military action by the
U.S. and other nations against this country?” This first question had five possible
responses: “strongly disapprove,” “disapprove,” “neutral,” “approve,” and “strongly
approve.” The second question was: “Overall, do you approve or disapprove of the
way the president is handling the situation in this country?” This second question had
five possible responses: “‘strongly disapprove,” “disapprove,” “neutral,” “approve,”
and “strongly approve.” The third question was: “Do you think the U.S. is doing
the right thing by taking part in the current military conflict in this country now,
or should the U.S. not be involved in this country now?” This third question had
five possible responses: “very wrong decision,” “wrong decision,” “neutral,” “right
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decision,” and “very right decision.” The fourth question was: “Do you think the level
of U.S. military involvement in the situation with this country should be increased,
decreased, or kept about the same as it is now?” This fourth question had three
possible responses: “decreased”, “kept about the same,” and “increased.”
3.4.2 An Experiment Using the Libyan Civil War
For the survey experiment using the Libyan Civil War of 2011, I used Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk to recruit a nonprobability sample of 450 subjects to complete “a
24-question opinion survey on Afghanistan and Libya” and used Qualtrics to collect
their responses from June 30, 2011 through July 3, 2011. I obtained 418 responses in
total because I eliminated the responses of subjects that failed to pass an instructional
manipulation check. This restriction does not significantly change the results in this
study.4
All subjects received the statement: “Now here are some questions on the U.S.
involvement in Libya.” The survey instrument then randomly assigned subjects to
either a control group or one of three treatment groups. Subjects in the control
group received neither a Democrat support cue nor a Republican opposition cue.
Subjects in the first treatment group received only a Democrat support cue given
by the statement: “Democrat President Barack Obama encouraged members of the
4In the survey experiment using the Libyan Civil War of 2011, the instructional manipulation
check consisted of a statement a question that all subjects received. The statement was: “Recent
research on decision making shows that choices are affected by context. Differences in how people
feel, their previous knowledge and experience, and their environment can affect choices. To help us
understand how people make decisions, we are interested in information about you. Specifically, we
are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, some results may
not tell us very much about decision making in the real world. To show that you have read the
instructions, please ignore the question on the next slide and instead choose only the ‘evenly mixed’
option as your answer.” The question following was: “Some people believe that the U.S. has been
successful in its operations in Iraq while others believe we have not been so successful. How do you
feel about the progress the U.S. has made in Iraq?” The question had five possible responses: “very
unsuccessful,” “unsuccessful,” “evenly mixed,” “successful,” and “very successful.”
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U.S. House of Representatives to vote in favor of a bill authorizing the limited use of
the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in Libya. The vote
took place on June 24, 2011.” Subjects in the second treatment group received only
a Republican opposition cue given by the statement: “On June 24, 2011, a majority
of Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives voted against a bill authorizing
the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in
Libya.” Subjects in the third treatment group received both the a Democrat support
cue and a Republican opposition cue given by the statement: “Democrat President
Barack Obama encouraged members of the U.S. House of Representatives to vote
in favor of a bill authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in
support of the NATO mission in Libya. When the vote took place on June 24, 2011,
a majority of Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives voted against the
authorization bill.”
All subjects then received four questions in a randomized sequence that asked
them about their positions on the Libyan Civil War. The first question was: “Which
of the following best describes your feelings about the current military action by
the U.S. and other nations against Libya?” This second question had five possible
responses: “strongly disapprove,” “disapprove,” “neutral,” “approve,” and “strongly
approve.” The second question was: “Overall, do you approve or disapprove of
the way President Barack Obama is handling the situation in Libya?” This second
question had five possible responses: “‘strongly disapprove,” “disapprove,” “neutral,”
“approve,” and “strongly approve.” The third question was: “Do you think the U.S.
is doing the right thing by taking part in the current military conflict in Libya now, or
should the U.S. not be involved in Libya now?” This third question had five possible
responses: “very wrong decision,” “wrong decision,” “neutral,” “right decision,” and
“very right decision.” The fourth question was: “Do you think the level of U.S.
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military involvement in the situation with Libya should be increased, decreased, or
kept about the same as it is now?” This fourth question had three possible responses:
“decreased”, “kept about the same,” and “increased.”
3.4.3 Elite Cues in the Experiments
The support cue and the opposition cue in both the hypothetical and Libya exper-
iments might seem arbitrary to the reader. First, the support cue is only given
by a Democrat—identified as “Democrat” in both experiments—and the opposition
cue is only given by a Republican—identified as “Republican.” Second, the support
cue is only given by the President—identified as “President” or “President Barack
Obama” in the hypothetical and Libya experiments, respectively—and the opposi-
tion cue is only given by a majority of one party’s members in the U.S. House of
Representatives—identified as “a majority of Republicans in the U.S. House of Rep-
resentatives” in both experiments. Third, the support cue is only given in the form of
one elite encouraging another to do something—identified as “encouraged members
of the U.S. House of Representatives to vote in favor of a bill” in both experiments—
and the opposition cue is only given in the form of one elite actually doing something
else—identified as “voted against” the bill in both experiments. Why do support cue
and opposition cue in both experiments take these particular forms?
I chose the treatments for the Libya experiment that I conducted between June
30, 2011 and July 3, 2011 in order to use support and opposition elite cues from an
event that occurred during the Libyan Civil War of 2011 only six days beforehand on
June 24, 2011. In fact, just as the Democrat support cue reads, “Democrat President
Barack Obama encouraged members of the U.S. House of Representatives to vote
in favor of a bill authorizing the limited use of the United States Armed Forces in
support of the NATO mission in Libya. The vote took place on June 24, 2011.” And
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in fact, just as the Republican opposition cue reads, “on June 24, 2011, a majority of
Republicans in the U.S. House of Representatives voted against a bill authorizing the
limited use of the United States Armed Forces in support of the NATO mission in
Libya.” So the treatments that I chose for the Libya experiment are real support and
opposition cues from political elites during a war: the opposition cue is only given
by a Democrat, by a President, and in the form of encouragement to do something,
while the support cue is only given by a Republican, by a majority in the House,
and in the form of actually doing something. I then chose the treatments for the
hypothetical experiment that I conducted approximately a year later between June 26,
2012 and July 3, 2012 to parallel as closely as possible these treatments from the Libya
experiment—with a support cue as a Democrat President encouraging the Republican
House to vote in favor of a bill and the opposition cue as Republican House voting
against that bill—in order to both replicate and check the robustness of my results in a
different context. Future research should consider an obvious extension missing from
this paper: conducting another hypothetical experiment with treatments in opposite
configuration from both the Libya experiment and my hypothetical experiment—with
a support cue as a Republican President encouraging a Democrat House to vote in
favor of a bill and the opposition cue as a Democrat House voting against that bill.
And as a brief aside, the treatments for both the hypothetical and Libya ex-
periment might also seem relatively—as Kinder (2007) puts it—“emaciated” to the
reader. In particular, neither the support cue nor the opposition cue contains an
argument in favor of the use of force or one against it, respectively, but only suggest
that elites take a position in favor of the use of force or one against it. I chose these
more emaciated treatments for the two experiments intentionally. I claim that they
minimally satisfy the actual definition of an elite cue and thus should provide a more
crucial test of my hypotheses about elites cues than less emaciated treatments would.
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3.5 Analysis
I test the hypotheses using data obtained from the two survey experiments.
3.5.1 Variable Coding
I begin by coding variables that indicate a subject’s partisan identification and treat-
ment group assignment in each of the survey experiments.
Partisan Identification Variables
Before each survey experiment, the survey instrument asked the two-part branching
question used by the ANES Time Series Studies to classify respondents into one of
seven ordered and mutually exclusive partisan identification categories: strong Demo-
crat, weak Democrat, independent Democrat, independent Independent, independent
Republican, weak Republican, and strong Republican. I code two variables that in-
dicate a subject’s partisan identification. First, if the subject is a strong Democrat, a
weak Democrat, or an independent Democrat, the variable Democrat takes the value
1 but the value 0 otherwise. Second, if the subject is a strong Republican, a weak
Republican, or an independent Republican, the variable Republican takes the value
1 but the value 0 otherwise. Under this coding, if the subject is an independent
Independent, the Democrat and Republican both take on the value 0.
Treatment Variables
I code three variables that indicate a subject’s treatment group assignment in each
survey experiment. First, if the survey instrument assigned the subject to the first
treatment group (T1), where he received only a Democrat support cue, the variable
President takes on the value 1 but 0 otherwise. Second, if the survey instrument
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assigned the subject to the second treatment group (T2), where he received only a
Republican opposition cue, the variable House takes on the value 1 but 0 otherwise.
Third, if the survey instrument assigned the subject to the to the third treatment
group (T3), where he received both a Democrat support cue and a Republican opposi-
tion cue, the variable Both takes on the value 1 but 0 otherwise. Under this coding, if
the survey instrument assigned the subject to the control group (C), where he did not
receive a Democrat support cue nor a Republican opposition cue, President, House,
and Both all take on the value 0.
Dependent Variables
I code four dependent variables corresponding to the four post-treatment questions in
each survey experiment: Approval, Handling, Right, and Level. These variables take
on ordered values which correspond to their ordered answers. For example, Approval
corresponds to the post-treatment question that asks subjects to give their approval
of the war. First, if the subject’s answer is “strongly disapprove,” then Approval
takes on the value 1. Second, if the subject’s answer is “disapprove,” then Approval
takes on the value 2. Third, if the subject’s answer is “neutral,” then Approval takes
on the value 3. Fourth, if the subject’s answer is “approve,” then Approval takes on
the value 4. Fifth, if the subject’s answer is “strongly approve,” then Approval takes
on the value 5. An analogous coding applies to the other three dependent variables.
3.5.2 Estimation
For each survey experiment, I perform three methods of analysis on the data obtained.
Let y ∈ {Approval,Handling,Right, Level}. In the first method, separately for
Democratic subjects (Democrat = 1) and Republican subjects (Republican = 1), I
perform three Welch unequal variances t-tests. The first tests the difference in the
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mean of each dependent variable y between those subjects assigned to the control
group (C) and those assigned to the first treatment group (T1). The second tests the
difference in the mean of each dependent variable y between those subjects assigned
to the control group (C) and those assigned to the second treatment group (T2). The
third tests the difference in the mean of each dependent variable y for those subjects
assigned to the control group (C) and those assigned to the third treatment group
(T3). In the second and third method, I estimate an ordinary least squares regression
model and an ordered logistic regression model for each dependent variable y. All
three methods yield nearly identical results. Therefore, I only present the results of
the first and second methods, which are both equivalent and the easier to understand
than the third method.
3.6 Results
For each of the four dependent variables Approval, Handling, Right, and Level in each
of the two wars, I present the difference in the means between subjects assigned to
the control group and subjects assigned to a treatment group, for each of the three
treatment groups, separately for Democratic and Republican subjects. Each figure
plots these three differences in the mean for a particular dependent variable in a
particular war accompanied by ninety percent confidence bands from a Welch unequal
variance t-test, with Democratic subjects as “squares” and Republican subjects as
“triangles.” Confidence bands that do not cross zero indicate a statistically significant
difference in means. I also present in parentheses equivalent results from an ordinary
least squares regression of each of the four dependent variables on the three indicator
treatment variables for both Democratic and Republican subjects, and full results
from this method are available in the appendix to this paper.
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What is evidence for each of the five hypotheses here? I explain using the depen-
dent variable Approval but the following explanation is analogous for the other three
dependent variables Handling, Right, and Level which also measure war support. I
explain using Democratic subjects but the following explanation is analogous for Re-
publican subjects. First, evidence for the support hypothesis (1) consists of those
Democratic subjects receiving only a Democrat support cue having higher mean Ap-
proval than those in the control group receiving no cues. Second, evidence for the
opposition hypothesis (2) consists of those Democratic subjects receiving only a Re-
publican opposition cue having higher mean Approval than those in the control group
receiving no cues. Evidence for the next three hypotheses depends on whether or not
there is evidence for either of these first two hypotheses. Third, evidence for the
heuristics hypothesis (3) consists of those Democratic subjects receiving both cues
having higher mean Approval than those in the control group receiving no cues given
that there is also evidence for either the support hypothesis (1) or the opposition
hypothesis (2). Fourth, evidence for the backlash hypothesis (4) consists of those
Democratic subjects receiving both cues having higher Approval than those in the
control group receiving no cues given that there is not evidence for either the sup-
port hypothesis (1) or the opposition hypothesis (2). Fifth, evidence for the hedging
hypothesis (5) consists of those Democratic subjects receiving both cues having the
same mean Approval as those in the control group receiving no cues given that there
is also evidence for either the support hypothesis (1) or the opposition hypothesis
(2). Again, this explanation is analogous for the other three dependent variables and
for Republican subjects. Unfortunately the relatively small sample sizes in the two
experiments—especially the number of Republican subjects—means that this study is
underpowered and cannot statistically distinguish more nuanced treatment impacts.
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As such, the standards of evidence that I present here are less nuanced than in a
study with more power but still suggestive of general patterns of results.
3.6.1 Approval
Approval measures a subject’s approval of each war on a 5-point scale {1, 2, 3, 4,
5}, with greater values corresponding to higher approval. Consider first the Approval
results for the hypothetical war in Figure 3.1a. For Democratic subjects, receiving
separately either a Democrat support cue or a Republican opposition cue increases
their approval (+0.33∗ with SE = 0.18 and +0.35∗ with SE = 0.18, respectively)
consistent with the support hypothesis (1) and opposition hypothesis (2), respectively.
Further, for Democratic subjects, receiving both cues together increases their approval
(+0.32∗ with SE = 0.19) by about the same as receiving either cue separately, a
pattern generally consistent with the heuristics hypothesis (3) but inconsistent with
the backlash hypothesis (4) and the hedging hypothesis (5). On the other hand,
nothing changes the approval of Republican subjects, inconsistent with all hypotheses.
Now consider the Approval results for Libya in Figure 3.1b. Nothing changes the
approval of Democratic nor Republican subjects, inconsistent with all hypotheses.
3.6.2 Handling
Handling measures a subject’s approval of each president’s handling of a war on a
5-point scale {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, with greater values corresponding to higher approval.
Consider first the Handling results for the hypothetical war in Figure 3.2a. For Demo-
cratic subjects, receiving separately either a Democrat support cue or a Republican
opposition cue does not change their approval of the president’s handling (−0.07
with SE = 0.18 and +0.21 with SE = 0.19, respectively), inconsistent with the sup-
port hypothesis (1) and the opposition hypothesis (2). But, for Democratic subjects,
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Figure 3.1. Approval. For the given war, each subfigure plots the differences in the means for
Approval between subjects assigned to the control group and subjects assigned to a treatment group,
for each of the treatment groups. Ninety percent confidence bands from a Welch unequal variance
t-test, with Democrat subjects as “squares” and Republican subjects as “triangles.”
receiving both cues together increases their approval (+0.40∗ with SE = 0.20), a pat-
tern generally consistent with the backlash hypothesis (4) but inconsistent with the
heuristics hypothesis (3) and the hedging hypothesis (5). On the other hand, nothing
changes the approval of Republican subjects, inconsistent with all hypotheses.
Now consider the Handling results for Libya in Figure 3.2b. Nothing changes the
approval of Democratic subjects, inconsistent with all hypotheses. On the other hand,
for Republican subjects, receiving separately either a Democrat support cue or a Re-
publican opposition cue decreases their approval (−0.53∗ with SE = 0.28 and −0.80∗
with SE = 0.28, respectively), consistent with the support hypothesis (1) and the
opposition hypothesis (2). But, for Republican subjects, receiving both cues together
does not change their approval (−0.36 with SE = 0.28), a pattern generally consistent
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with the hedging hypothesis (5) but inconsistent with the heuristics hypothesis (3)
and the backlash hypothesis (4).
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Figure 3.2. Handling. For the given war, each figure plots the differences in the means for
Handling between subjects assigned to the control group and subjects assigned to a treatment
group, for each of the treatment groups. Ninety percent confidence bands from a Welch unequal
variance t-test, with Democrat subjects as “squares” and Republican subjects as “triangles.”
3.6.3 Right
Right measures a subject’s perceived rightness of each war on a 5-point scale {1, 2, 3,
4, 5}, with greater values corresponding to higher rightness. Consider first the Right
results for the hypothetical war in Figure 3.3a. For Democratic subjects, receiving
separately either a Democrat support cue or a Republican opposition cue increases
their perception (+0.39∗ with SE = 0.17 and +0.40∗ with SE = 0.18, respectively),
consistent with the support hypothesis (1) and the opposition hypothesis (2). Fur-
ther, for Democratic subjects, receiving both cues together increases their perception
(+0.37∗ with SE = 0.19) by about the same as receiving either cue separately, a pat-
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tern generally consistent with the heuristics hypothesis (3) but inconsistent with the
backlash hypothesis (4) and the hedging hypothesis (5). On the other hand, for Re-
publican subjects, receiving only the Democrat support cue decreases their perception
(−0.56∗ with SE = 0.30), consistent with the support hypothesis (1), but receiving
only the Republican opposition cue does not change their perception (−0.37 with SE
= 0.28), inconsistent with the opposition hypothesis (2). But for Republican subjects,
receiving both cues together does not change their approval (−0.33 with SE = 0.32),
a pattern generally consistent with the hedging hypothesis (5) but inconsistent with
the heuristics hypothesis (3) and the backlash hypothesis (4).
Now consider the Right results for Libya in Figure 3.3b. Nothing changes the
perception of Democratic subjects, inconsistent with all hypotheses. On the other
hand, for Republican subjects, receiving separately either a Democrat support cue
or a Republican opposition cue decreases their perception (−0.57∗ with SE = 0.30
and −0.52∗ with SE = 0.31, respectively), consistent with the support hypothesis (1)
and the opposition hypothesis (2). But, for Republican subjects, receiving both cues
together does not change their perception (−0.34 with SE = 0.30), a pattern gener-
ally consistent with the hedging hypothesis (5) but inconsistent with the heuristics
hypothesis (3) and the backlash hypothesis (4).
3.6.4 Level
Level measures a subject’s preferred level of involvement for each war on a 3-point
scale {1, 2, 3}, with greater values corresponding to higher involvement. Consider
first the Level results for the hypothetical war in Figure 3.4a. For Democratic sub-
jects, receiving separately either a Democrat support cue or a Republican opposition
cue increases their preference (+0.33∗ with SE = 0.12 and +0.29∗ with SE = 0.13, re-
spectively), consistent with the support hypothesis (1) and the opposition hypothesis
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Figure 3.3. Right. For the given war, each figure plots the differences in the means for Right
between subjects assigned to the control group and subjects assigned to a treatment group, for each
of the treatment groups. Ninety percent confidence bands from a Welch unequal variance t-test,
with Democrat subjects as “squares” and Republican subjects as “triangles.”
(2). But, for Democratic subjects, receiving both cues together does not change their
preference (+0.13 with SE = 0.14), a pattern generally consistent with the hedging
hypothesis (5) but inconsistent with the heuristics hypothesis (3) and the backlash
hypothesis (4). Nothing changes the preference of Republican subjects, inconsistent
with all hypotheses.
Now consider the Level results for Libya in Figure 3.4b. Nothing changes the pref-
erence of Democratic subjects, inconsistent with all hypotheses. On the other hand,
for Republican subjects, receiving only the Democrat support cue does not change
their preference (−0.18 with SE = 0.18), inconsistent with the support hypothesis (1),
but receiving only the Republican opposition cue decreases their preference (−0.37∗
with SE = 0.18), consistent with the opposition hypothesis (2). But, for Republi-
can subjects, receiving both cues together does not change their preference (−0.01
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with SE = 0.17), a pattern generally consistent with the hedging hypothesis (5) but
inconsistent with the heuristics hypothesis (3) and the backlash hypothesis (4).
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Figure 3.4. Level. For the given war, each figure plots the differences in the means for Level
between subjects assigned to the control group and subjects assigned to a treatment group, for each
of the treatment groups. Ninety percent confidence bands from a Welch unequal variance t-test,
with Democrat subjects as “squares’ and Republican subjects as “triangles.”
3.7 Discussion & Conclusion
The consistency of these results and the hypotheses differs across the four dependent
variables as well as across the two experiments. However, these differences are not
unexpected nor unexplainable. First, the four dependent variables may measure
different dimensions of subjects’ war support contra the conventional wisdom of the
literature on the use of force (see Berinsky and Druckman, 2007; Gelpi and Reifler,
2008). Second, one experiment involves a real war, while the other experiment involves
a hypothetical war based on it. Cues come from real partisan elites in the former
experiment but from hypothetical ones in the latter experiment (see Nicholson, 2012).
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Further, subjects’ prior experiences contaminate the cues in the former experiment
but not in the latter experiment (see Gelpi, 2010). Although these two explanations
are reasonable, little is actually known about how and why the results of these two
types of experiments diverge. Regardless of the differences, some findings emerge.
Consider the consistency of the results and the hypotheses across the four dependent
variables for the experiment involving the hypothetical war in Table 3.3 and for the
experiment involving Libya in Table 3.4. Each experiment yields evidence or not for
each of five hypotheses on each of four dependent variables (measures), or, that is, in
twenty hypothesis-measure cases.
Opposition Support Heuristics Backlash Hedging
Approval D D D
Handling D
Rightness D D R D R
Level D D D
Table 3.3. Evidence for the hypotheses from the hypothetical experiment. The hypothet-
ical experiment tests each of the five hypotheses (columns) using each of the four measures (rows).
A “D” in a cell indicates evidence among Democrats for the hypothesis given by the column using
the measure given by the row, and an “R” in a cell indicates the same for Republicans. A blank cell
indicates no evidence.
Opposition Support Heuristics Backlash Hedging
Approval
Handling R R R
Rightness R R R
Level R R
Table 3.4. Evidence for the hypotheses from the Libya experiment. The Libya experiment
tests each of the five hypotheses (columns) using each of the four measures (rows). A “D” in a
cell indicates evidence among Democrats for the hypothesis given by the column using the measure
given by the row, and an “R” in a cell indicates the same for Republicans. A blank cell indicates no
evidence.
Consider a first finding. For Democratic subjects, receiving cues from partisan
elites changes their position on the hypothetical war but does not change at all
their position on Libya. For Republican subjects, receiving cues from partisan elites
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changes their position on Libya but does not change their position that much on
the hypothetical war. For Democratic subjects, the hypothetical experiment yields
evidence in ten of the twenty hypothesis-measure cases, but the Libya experiment
yields no evidence in any of them. On the other hand, for Republican subjects, the
hypothetical experiment yields evidence in just two of the twenty hypothesis-measure
cases, but the Libya experiment yields evidence in eight of them. This finding sur-
prised me, and since it goes beyond this paper’s hypotheses, I leave the reader to
conjecture. However, this rigorously shows for the first time in the literature that the
results of experiments otherwise similar but different in their war context can diverge
significantly. Future research should explore why this is the case.
Consider a second finding. The support hypothesis and the opposition hypothe-
sis successfully predict changes in the positions of both Democratic and Republican
subjects during one-sided information flows, taking into account the first insight. For
Democratic subjects, the hypothetical experiment yields evidence in six of the eight
hypothesis-measure cases in the “Support” and “Opposition” columns of Table 3.3.
However, for Democratic subjects, the Libya experiment yields no evidence in any
of the eight hypothesis-measure cases in the “Support” and “Opposition” columns
of Table 3.4. For Republican subjects, the Libya experiment yields evidence in five
of the eight hypothesis-measure cases in the “Support” and “Opposition” columns of
Table 3.4. However, for Republican subjects, the hypothetical experiment yields evi-
dence in just one of the hypothesis-measure cases in the “Support” or “Opposition”
columns of Table 3.3. This experimentally corroborates the claims of the heuristics
literature in the case of one-sided information flows, limited by the first finding above.
Consider a third finding. The general pattern of results is consistent with the
hedging hypothesis successfully predicting changes in the positions of Republican
subjects during two-sided information flows. However, no single hypothesis success-
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fully predicts changes in the positions of Democratic subjects, although the hedging
hypothesis seems to work best based on the general pattern of results. For Republican
subjects, the Libya experiment yields evidence in three of the four hypothesis-measure
cases in the “Hedging” column of Table 3.4 but no evidence in any of the cases in the
“Heuristics” and “Backlash” columns. Further, for Republican subjects, the hypo-
thetical experiment yields evidence in one of the four hypothesis-measure cases in the
“Hedging” column of Table 3.3 but no evidence in any of the cases in the “Heuris-
tics” and “Backlash” columns. For Democratic subjects, the hypothetical experiment
yields evidence in two of the four hypothesis-measure cases in the “Hedging” column,
one of the cases in the “Heuristics” column, and one of the cases in the “Backlash”
column. Further, for Democrat subjects, the Libya experiment yields no evidence in
any of the cases in the “Heuristics,” “Backlash,” and “Hedging” columns. This ex-
perimentally demonstrates some evidence for my claim about hedging, limited by the
first finding above. I find little experimental support for the claims of the heuristics
and backlash literatures.
In this paper, I fulfill two objectives. First, I develop a theoretical extension of
the elite-driven hypothesis that I call the hedging effect. The version of the elite-
driven hypothesis with the hedging effect anticipates that polarized elites result in a
less polarized public than unpolarized elites do in time of war. Again, I emphasize
here that there are other possible theoretical extensions of the elite-driven hypothesis
that might also explain this outcome, but I leave the task of empirically adjudicating
among these possibilities for future research. Second, I test the version of the elite-
driven hypothesis with the hedging effect against the original version and the version
with the backlash effect using data I obtained from two original survey experiments
in the context of the Libyan Civil War of 2011. Both of these other versions of the
elite-driven hypothesis anticipate that polarized elites result in at least an equally
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polarized public compared to the effect of unpolarized elites. The third finding above
reveals that the version of the elite-driven hypothesis with the hedging effect seems
to perform the best of the three based on the general pattern of empirical results.
In fulfilling these two objectives, I discover that polarized elites do not necessarily
lead to a polarized public, but at least sometimes seem to lead to an unpolarized
public—and that hedging might be one explanation of this outcome.
3.A Hedging versus Resisting
In both the experiment using the hypothetical war and the one using the Libyan Civil
War of 2011, all subjects received four questions in randomized sequence that mea-
sured their political knowledge. The first question was: “Who has a responsibility
to decide if a law is Constitutional or not...is it the President, the Congress, or the
Supreme Court?” The second question was: “And whose responsibility is it to nomi-
nate judges to Federal Courts...the President, the Congress, or the Supreme Court?”
These first and second questions had three possible responses: “The President,” “The
Congress,” and “The Supreme Court.” The third question was: “Which party has
the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington?” The fourth
question was: “Which party has the most members in the U.S. Senate?” These third
and fourth questions had two possible responses: “Democrats” and “Republicans.” I
code a variable that indicates a subject’s political knowledge. If the subject correctly
answered all four of these questions that measure political knowledge, the variable
Know takes the value 1 but 0 otherwise. Also recall from the Analysis section of
this paper the coding of two indicator variables for a subject’s partisanship (Demo-
crat, Republican) and the coding of three indicator variables for a subject’s treatment
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group assignment (House, President, Both) as well as the coding of the four ordered
dependent variables (Approval, Handling, Right, Level).
An estimation of the regression coefficients of the equation
y = β1House+ β2President+ β3Both (3.1)
for y ∈ {Approval,Handling,Right, Level} for both Democratic subjects (Democrat =
1) and Republican subjects (Republican = 1) gives the respective causal impacts of
the treatment group assignment. In the case of y = Approval and likewise for the
other three dependent variables, βˆ1 gives the impact of a Republican opposition cue
on Approval, βˆ2 gives the impact of a Democrat support cue on Approval, and βˆ3
gives the impact of both cues on Approval. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6 present these
results for both the hypothetical experiment and the Libya experiment, respectively,
and they are necessarily equivalent to those results presented in the Results section
of this paper.
As mentioned in the main text’s discussion, relative political knowledge indicated
by the variable Know allows a cursory adjudication between the resistance axiom
and the hedging mechanism. In particular, under the resistance axiom, the im-
pact of receiving both cues (Both = 1) should be equal to or larger in magnitude
than the impacts of receiving only the Republican opposition cue (House = 1) or
only the Democrat support cue (President = 1) for those subjects with relatively
more political knowledge (Know = 1) compared to those with relatively less po-
litical knowledge (Know = 0). But under the hedging mechanism, the impact of
receiving both cues (Both = 1) should be smaller in magnitude than the impacts of
receiving only the Republican opposition cue (House = 1) or only the Democrat sup-
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port cue (President = 1) for those subjects with relatively more political knowledge
(Know = 1) compared to those with relatively less political knowledge (Know = 0).
So an estimation of the regression coefficients of the equation
y = β1House+ β2President+ β3Both
+ γ1House×Know + γ2President×Know + γ3Both×Know
+ γ4Know (3.2)
for y ∈ {Approval,Handling,Right, Level} for both Democratic subjects (Democrat =
1) and Republican subjects (Republican = 1) gives the respective causal impacts of
the treatment group assignment conditional on political knowledge (Know = 1 and
Know = 0). In the case of y = Approval and likewise for the other three dependent
variables, βˆ1 gives the impact of a Republican opposition cue on Approval for un-
knowledgeable subjects, βˆ2 gives the impact of a Democrat support cue on Approval
for unknowledgeable subjects, and βˆ3 gives the impact of both cues on Approval for
unknowledgeable subjects. And further, βˆ1 + γˆ1 gives the impact of a Republican
opposition cue on Approval for knowledgeable subjects, βˆ2 + γˆ2 gives the impact of a
Democrat support cue on Approval for knowledgeable, subjects and βˆ3 + γˆ3 gives the
impact of both cues on Approval for knowledgeable subjects. Table 3.5 and Table 3.6
also present these results for both the hypothetical experiment and the Libya exper-
iment, respectively, which differ from the results presented in the Results section of
this paper.
There are only two cases in which there is some partial evidence of the resis-
tance axiom over the hedging mechanism. The first of these cases is on the variable
Approve for Republican subjects in the Libya experiment. Neither cue separately
nor in combination impacts Approve for politically unknowledgeable Republicans in
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Libya. But both cues separately and in combination impact Approve for politically
knowledgeable Republicans in Libya in a statistically indistinguishable way. This is
partial evidence of the resistance axiom over the hedging mechanism: the impact
of receiving both cues is equal to the magnitude the impacts of receiving only the
Republican opposition cue or only the Democrat support cue for knowledgeable Re-
publicans compared to unknowledgeable Republicans. The second of these cases is
on the variable Handling for Republican subjects in the Libya experiment—and this
second case is almost completely parallel to the first. Neither cue separately nor in
combination impacts Handling for politically unknowledgeable Republicans in Libya.
But both cues separately and in combination impact Handling for politically knowl-
edgeable Republicans in Libya in a statistically indistinguishable way. This is partial
evidence of the resistance axiom over the hedging mechanism for the same reason as
in the first case. Of course, I caution that while there is only partial evidence for the
resistance axiom over the hedging mechanism in only two cases—suggesting that the
hedging mechanism is at least a plausible alternative to the resistance axiom—future
research should investigate this issue further, especially with a larger sample size that
would allow a more confident exploration of subgroup impacts from elite cues.
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Democrat = 1 Democrat = 1 Republican = 1 Republican = 1
Approval
House 0.33* (0.18) 0.25 (0.23) -0.30 (0.28) -0.19 (0.36)
President 0.35* (0.18) 0.46* (0.24) 0.02 (0.30) 0.11 (0.43)
Both 0.32* (0.19) 0.45* (0.24) -0.22 (0.32) 0.00 (0.43)
House × Know 0.19 (0.35) -0.30 (0.58)
President × Know -0.26 (0.37) -0.20 (0.63)
Both × Know -0.43 (0.41) -0.52 (0.66)
Know -0.01 (0.25) 0.09 (0.40)
Handling
House -0.07 (0.18) -0.13 (0.24) -0.29 (0.29) -0.26 (0.38)
President 0.21 (0.19) 0.21 (0.25) 0.38 (0.32) 0.56 (0.45)
Both 0.40* (0.20) 0.50* (0.25) 0.17 (0.34) 0.44 (0.45)
House × Know 0.13 (0.37) -0.08 (0.61)
President × Know 0.01 (0.38) -0.39 (0.66)
Both × Know -0.33 (0.42) -0.65 (0.70)
Know 0.05 (0.26) 0.19 (0.42)
Right
House 0.39* (0.17) 0.38 (0.23) -0.37 (0.28) -0.41 (0.36)
President 0.40* (0.18) 0.35 (0.24) -0.56* (0.30) -0.67 (0.43)
Both 0.37* (0.19) 0.48* (0.24) -0.33 (0.32) -0.11 (0.43)
House × Know 0.03 (0.35) 0.11 (0.58)
President × Know 0.14 (0.37) 0.27 (0.62)
Both × Know -0.34 (0.41) -0.46 (0.66)
Know 0.02 (0.25) -0.22 (0.40)
Level
House 0.33* (0.12) 0.25 (0.17) -0.13 (0.19) -0.19 (0.24)
President 0.29* (0.13) 0.25 (0.17) -0.07 (0.21) 0.17 (0.29)
Both 0.13 (0.14) 0.17 (0.17) -0.05 (0.22) 0.17 (0.29)
House × Know 0.19 (0.25) 0.17 (0.39)
President × Know 0.10 (0.26) -0.39 (0.42)
Both × Know -0.15 (0.29) -0.47 (0.44)
Know -0.04 (0.18) -0.22 (0.27)
Table 3.5. Estimates for the causal impacts of elite cues from the hypothetical ex-
periment. Columns give four estimated regression equations for dependent variables Approval,
Handling, Right, and Level from the hypothetical experiment with independent variables corre-
sponding to rows. Models both exclude and include an interaction for incorrectly (Know = 0) or
correctly (Know = 1) answering all political knowledge questions and and include both Democratic
subjects (Democrat = 1) or include Republican subjects (Republican = 1). Coefficient estimates
in cells correspond to standard errors in parentheses and the presence of asterisk indicating 90%
statistical significance.
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Democrat = 1 Democrat = 1 Republican = 1 Republican = 1
Approval
House 0.05 (0.21) 0.03 (0.30) -0.19 (0.30) 0.32 (0.38)
President 0.11 (0.20) 0.16 (0.26) -0.30 (0.30) 0.27 (0.42)
Both 0.00 (0.20) 0.03 (0.27) -0.05 (0.29) 0.32 (0.37)
House × Know 0.02 (0.42) -1.16* (0.56)
President × Know -0.11 (0.42) -0.93* (0.57)
Both × Know -0.05 (0.41) -1.05* (0.56)
Know 0.14 (0.28) 0.08 (0.41)
Handling
House -0.03 (0.20) -0.02 (0.29) -0.53* (0.28) -0.10 (0.36)
President -0.04 (0.20) 0.02 (0.25) -0.80* (0.28) -0.02 (0.40)
Both -0.04 (0.19) -0.06 (0.26) -0.36 (0.28) 0.06 (0.34)
House × Know -0.04 (0.41) -0.97* (0.52)
President × Know -0.13 (0.41) -1.28* (0.53)
Both × Know 0.05 (0.40) -1.16* (0.52)
Know 0.16 (0.27) 0.17 (0.39)
Right
House 0.31 (0.22) 0.28 (0.31) -0.57* (0.30) -0.44 (0.41)
President 0.24 (0.21) 0.26 (0.27) -0.52* (0.31) -0.17 (0.46)
Both 0.05 (0.21) 0.00 (0.28) -0.34 (0.30) -0.23 (0.40)
House × Know 0.06 (0.44) -0.33 (0.60)
President × Know -0.05 (0.43) -0.52 (0.61)
Both × Know 0.13 (0.42) -0.42 (0.60)
Know 0.02 (0.29) -0.17 (0.45)
Level
House 0.00 (0.12) 0.01 (0.17) -0.37* (0.18) -0.40* (0.24)
President 0.07 (0.11) 0.19 (0.15) -0.18 (0.18) -0.02 (0.27)
Both -0.03 (0.11) -0.03 (0.15) -0.01 (0.17) 0.06 (0.23)
House × Know -0.01 (0.24) 0.04 (0.35)
President × Know -0.36 (0.24) -0.23 (0.36)
Both × Know 0.01 (0.23) -0.28 (0.35)
Know 0.03 (0.16) -0.17 (0.26)
Table 3.6. Estimates for the causal impacts of elite cues from the Libya experiment.
Columns give four estimated regression equations for dependent variables Approval, Handling, Right,
and Level from the Libya experiment with independent variables corresponding to rows. Models both
exclude and include an interaction for incorrectly (Know = 0) or correctly (Know = 1) answering
all political knowledge questions and and include both Democratic subjects (Democrat = 1) or
include Republican subjects (Republican = 1). Coefficient estimates in cells correspond to standard
errors in parentheses and the presence of asterisk indicating 90% statistical significance.
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